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In its early years, the European project was an elite-driven venture in which the political elite of the original six 
member states aimed to create a European Community (EC) based on tight economic cooperation between European 
nation-states. Because of the economic nature of the integration, there was no pressing need to engage the public in 
the process, and thus popular opinion played only a minor role in the integration process. The situation changed in 
the early 1990’s when EC turned into European Union. This resulted in a fundamental institutional reform and 
introduced supranational elements to decision-making, thus adding a new political dimension to the integration. 
Consequently, the European project became a more salient issue on national political agendas, which in turn was 
followed by a more systematic and persistent opposition towards it.  
Since the 1990’s, the Union has acknowledged the increasing importance of public support towards the European 
integration. It has become widely accepted that citizens have the ability and the willingness to constrain, modify, and 
eventually forestall the integration process. This trend has also affected the field of European studies. However, the 
research on euroscepticism is marked by tremendous diversity, in terms of object of study, level of analysis as well 
as methodology, and this diversity has subsequently resulted in scattered and inconsistent accumulated knowledge 
within the field of study, as well as in contradicting results.  
This thesis studies public euroscepticism in Finland using David Easton’s theory of diffuse and specific political 
support, further elaborated by Pippa Norris. The thesis focuses on four objects of support, namely the political 
community, regime principles, regime performance and regime institutions. The level of support can be seen as 
ranging in a continuum from the most diffuse support for the system down through successive levels to the most 
concrete, specific support. Finnish public opinion will be analysed through quantitative measures, using the European 
Commission's Standard Eurobarometer poll from November 2013 (EB 80.1). The objective is to determine whether 
the four objects of support are independently manifested, to assess how much of Finnish euroscepticism can be 
accounted for by the four objects of support and to find out which independent variables explain the perceived 
dimensions of euroscepticism more specifically. The study is done through an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), 
followed by a series of multiple regression analyses. 
Four distinct factors arise from the analysis, depicting the four objects of support. These factors account for 63% of 
the total variance. The results also show that on average, Finns tend to hold more positive than negative feelings 
towards the European Union. A few distinct topics arise from the results: The overall favourable attitudes of the 
Finnish public, using of national proxies as basis for opinion formation and identification to the nation instead of 
Europe. Economic considerations are not found to have a big impact, nor are there clear indicators of diffuse or 
specific support as such. 
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Euroopan yhteisö (EY) oli alkujaan poliittisen eliitin ajama hanke, jonka päämääränä oli taloudellisen yhteistyön 
tiivistäminen läntisessä Euroopassa. Integraation puhtaasta taloudellisesta luonteesta johtuen julkisella mielipiteellä 
ei juurikaan ollut painoarvoa, eikä jäsenvaltioiden kansalaisia ollut tarpeen sitouttaa taloudelliseen yhteistyöhön. 
Tilanne kuitenkin muuttui 1990-luvun alussa kun Euroopan yhteisöstä tuli Euroopan unioni (EU). EU:ssa tapahtui 
perustavanlaatuisia institutionaalisia muutoksia, päätöksentekoon lisättiin ylikansallisia elementtejä ja unioni sai 
uuden, poliittisen ulottuvuuden. Euroopan integraatio alkoi kiinnostaa poliitikkoja ja kansalaisia myös kansallisella 
tasolla, mikä puolestaan johti myös EU-kriittisiin asenteisiin ja mielipiteisiin jäsenvaltioissa. 1990-luvulta lähtien 
julkisen mielipiteen tärkeys on tunnustettu myös EU:ssa, ja nykyään tiedostetaan että kansalaisilla on sekä kykyä 
että halua estää, muokata ja viivyttää integraation etenemistä. Siksi myös tutkijat ovat entistä kiinnostuneempia EU-
kriittisyyden eri muodoista ja syistä. Tutkijoiden keskuudessa on kuitenkin erimielisyyttä siitä mitä EU-
kriittisyydellä ylipäänsä tarkoitetaan ja miten sitä kannattaisi tutkia. Näistä erimielisyyksistä johtuen tutkimuksista 
onkin saatu varsin ristiriitaisia ja epäjohdonmukaisia tuloksia. 
Tässä pro gradu -tutkielmassa tutkitaan suomalaisten EU-kriittisyyttä käyttäen teoreettisena viitekehyksenä David 
Eastonin teoriaa diffuusista ja spesifistä poliittisen järjestelmän kannatuksesta, jota Pippa Norris on sittemmin 
työstänyt edelleen. Kannatuksen taso käsitetään jatkumona laajasta järjestelmän kannatuksesta yksityiskohtaiseen 
kannatukseen. Tutkielmassa keskitytään neljään poliittisen kannatuksen kohteeseen, joita ovat poliittinen yhteisö, 
poliittisen järjestelmän periaatteet, järjestelmän toimivuus sekä instituutiot. Aineistona käytetään vakiomuotoista 
eurobarometriaineistoa marraskuulta 2013 (EB 80.1). Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on faktori- ja regressioanalyysien 
avulla määrittää kannatuksen alalajien esiintyvyyttä, jotta voidaan arvioida kuinka suomalainen euroskeptisyys 
näyttäytyy tämän typologian valossa. Lisäksi on tarkoitus selvittää mitkä taustamuuttujat vaikuttavat suomalaisten 
EU-kriittisyyteen. 
Tutkimusaineistosta voidaan johtaa neljä erillistä faktoria jotka selittävät 63% havaitusta varianssista. Tuloksista käy 
ilmi että suomalaisilla on keskimäärin melko positiivinen suhde Euroopan unioniin. Kansalliset tekijät EU-
mielipiteiden muodostuksessa sekä samaistuminen kansallisvaltioon ovat myös tärkeitä tekijöitä suomalaisten EU-
kriittisyyden taustalla. Taloudellisilla kysymyksillä ei tutkimuksen mukaan näytä olevan suurta merkitystä, eikä 
aineistosta nouse esiin tekijöitä jotka suoraan selittäisivät diffuusin tai spesifin kannatuksen puutetta. 
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1 Introduction 
In its early years, the European project was an elite-driven venture in which the political 
elite of the original six member states aimed to create a European Community (EC) based 
on tight economic cooperation between European nation-states. The ultimate goal was to 
ensure peace and prosperity to the whole continent. Because of the economic nature of 
the integration, there was no pressing need to engage the public in the process, and thus 
popular opinion played only a minor role in the integration process. Political scepticism 
was mainly equated with judging the EC in terms of its ability to provide tangible 
economic benefits.  
The entry of the United Kingdom to the Community brought the first openly sceptic 
figures to the European political arena, but the events of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
had a more dramatic effect on the European process. The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
- which allowed Finland, Sweden and Austria to apply for membership as it no longer 
contradicted the official neutrality politics of these countries - changed the perspective of 
the integration process substantially. The EC started to prepare for the entry of a 
significant number of new independent nation-states. This in turn required a fundamental 
institutional reform, because, with the Maastricht Treaty in place, the European 
Community would turn into a European Union. Notably, the Treaty would reinforce the 
supranational elements of the EU and add a new political dimension of integration. 
Consequently, the European project became a more salient issue on national political 
agendas, which in turn was followed by a more systematic and persistent opposition 
towards it. The Danes voted against the Maastricht Treaty, and in France, where 
population had traditionally been largely in favour of the integration, the ‘yes’ side won 
with a mere 51 % of the votes cast.  The age of the permissive consensus was officially 
over.  
Since the 1990’s the citizens of Europe have expressed their malcontent towards the 
integration process in referenda organised in member states. The Dutch and the French 
‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty in 2004, and the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland 
in 2008, serve as illustrative examples. At the same time, the Union has acknowledged 
the increasing importance of public support towards the European integration. It has 
become widely accepted that citizens have the ability and, more importantly, the 
willingness to constrain, modify, and eventually forestall the integration process. Member 
states have also acknowledged the importance of public support, and heads of states as 
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well as national governments have used public opinion as a bargaining chip at 
intergovernmental conferences. References to the eurosceptic public are made in order to 
justify and secure national interests. (Sørensen 2007, 21.) Public opinion thus affects the 
everyday decisions made within the EU institutions and affects the process of European 
integration and the Union’s policy shaping both indirectly through national governments 
and directly through the public’s political action. 
Finland has been a member of the European Union since 1995. Although Finns were 
eager to join the EC in 1994, on average about 28 % have held a negative view on EU 
membership since joining. Especially the first decade of 2000’s showed more negative 
feelings towards the EU. For example in 2005, only 33 % of Finns held a positive attitude 
towards EU membership, and as many as 31 % opposed to it. In recent years, the attitudes 
have grown more positive despite the economic crisis, and in 2014, 42 % of Finns viewed 
EU membership as positive, whereas only 24 % had a negative view. (Haavisto 2014, 96.) 
However, Finnish public support toward the European Union has not been much 
researched, and therefore the underlying reasons behind Finnish euroscepticism still 
remain unclear.  
1.1 Research questions 
In this thesis I am going to study public euroscepticism in Finland, using David Easton’s 
(1965a, 1965b) theory of diffuse and specific political support, further elaborated by 
Pippa Norris (1999, 2011). Norris’ typology offers a fivefold classification that 
distinguishes between support towards the political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political authorities. These levels can be seen as 
ranging in a continuum from the most diffuse support for the system down through 
successive levels to the most concrete, specific, support for particular politicians. This 
approach has been applied by others (Berglund et al. 2006, Boomgarden et al. 2011, 
Ringlerova 2014, Armingeon & Ceka, 2014), and it has given important insight on 
support, or the lack thereof, toward the European Union. Unfortunately, these studies have 
mainly relied on single items as the dependent variables, thus only giving a one-
dimensional view of euroscepticism towards the European Union. However, since 
euroscepticism is a multifaceted concept, this study uses multiple dependent variables in 
order to better grasp its diverse nature. 
For Easton, the systems support is understood as a psychological orientation, or the 
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supportive state of mind (Easton 1957, 390). Attitudes are often inferred from tacit 
actions, such as voting behaviour. However, it is often problematic to infer psychological 
orientations from behaviour, since citizens may act from various motives, such as fear, 
habit, or a sense of duty, without necessarily supporting the regime. More reliable 
indicators of citizens’ psychological orientations can be derived from public opinion polls 
conducted according to strict scientific standards. Common indicators are exemplified by 
a sense of belonging to, and identification with, the community, positive attitudes towards 
the political system and the core institutions, and approval of the incumbent officeholders. 
Political support can be regarded as a dichotomy (citizens either do or do not reject the 
political system), or more commonly as a continuum with varied degrees and levels. 
Support for the political system is also rarely unconditional. Instead, it is often directed 
toward particular components. Furthermore, systems support has both affective and 
evaluative aspects. Citizens may accept the authority of the system, its institutions and 
actors out of loyalty or sense of patriotism, but support may also be more conditional, 
depending on a more rational calculation of system performance. (Norris 2011, 20-21.) 
Norris (1999, 2011) has elaborated Easton’s original model to include five objects of 
support, namely support for the political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political actors. This thesis will focus on the first 
four, and the objective is to 
 
a) Determine whether the four objects of support are independently manifested 
through Eurobarometer polls. 
b) Assess how much of Finnish euroscepticism can be accounted for by the four 
objects of support. 
c) Find out which independent variables explain the perceived dimensions of 
euroscepticism more specifically. 
 
Lack of, or low support – if such is found - is regarded as a sceptic attitude towards that 
particular object of support and is thus deemed a dimension of euroscepticism. The study 
is done through an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), followed by a series of multiple 
regression analyses. This thesis is intended as an introductory study on Finnish popular 
attitudes towards the different aspects of the European Union, as these attitudes have not 
been studied in detail before.  
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1.2 Public opinion as an object of study 
Ontologically it is debatable whether public opinion truly exists, and, consequently 
whether it is even worth studying for. Whether public opinion and the attitudes of the 
‘common citizen’ are feasible objects of scientific study essentially depends on the 
importance given to the term as a component in the democratic process. For example 
Plato, although respecting the public will in principle, was sceptical of the common 
person’s wisdom. In contrast, Aristotle defended the common man and the voice of the 
public, and Machiavelli in turn did respect the public opinion, but only because it was a 
potential political force that could bring harm to the state. For him, public opinion did not 
have an inherent value. (Glynn et al. 1999, 38.) 
Like Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes also had a negative view of the human nature. He 
believed that people are in a constant competition over property, reputation and personal 
safety. People are needed and public opinion is crucial in formation of the state (a social 
contract is created by the people and the leaders of the state), but once the state is 
established, there is very little need for political participation by citizens. (Hobbes 1970.) 
John Locke, on the other hand, believed that all men were born equal, able to understand 
and cooperate with each other (Locke 1963, 110). Hence, for him, articulation of the 
public opinion is a critical part of politics. 
During the Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau developed a theory of the state with 
the public opinion occupying a central role. He was also sceptical about the abilities of 
the common citizen, but nevertheless saw the necessity of placing some amount of power 
in the hands of the public. Like Locke, Rousseau was concerned about the rights of the 
individual, yet he also placed an enormous value on community. He believed that citizens 
were capable of thinking about the general good of the society, and should articulate it 
through the general will (volonté générale). (Rousseau 1980.) Liberal theorists, such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill were cautious of the possibility of tyranny of the 
majority, where the “collective mediocrity” would override reason. To prevent this from 
happening, the elite would have to limit the excessive use of public opinion. (Splichal 
1999, 68.)   
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has famously stated that “public opinion does not 
exist” (Bourdieu 1972, title). According to him, the very notion of public opinion 
presupposes that everyone has an opinion, that all opinions count as much, and that there 
is an agreement on which questions merit to be posed. Bourdieu claims that these 
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underlying premises of the notion are simply not true, and therefore the concept itself 
does not exist. For him, public opinion is merely a tool for the incumbent government to 
maintain the illusion of the opinion of the majority as a means to legitimize its power. 
(Ibid., 1-3.) 
In modern political theory, the notion of public opinion coincides with the notion of 
political participation. The former assumes at least some degree of the latter. The success 
of democracy is largely measured by the public’s participation in the political process, the 
respect for citizen rights, and the responsiveness of the system to popular demands 
(Dalton 2008, 2). This responsiveness ensures the legitimacy - the public’s belief that a 
leader has the right to govern – of the government, which in turn makes creating and 
enforcing laws easier for the regime. Furthermore, taking individual preferences and 
expectations into account is a very democratic goal in two ways. First, it allows each 
individual to assess whether what he or she thinks is in accordance to his/her values and 
needs. This in turn reinforces the demand for individual autonomy. Second, the idea that 
every citizen’s preferences are equally important fulfils the demand for political equality 
in a regime. (Setälä 2003, 32.) It has even been argued that public opinion bestows 
nowadays the “aura of legitimacy” on modern political life (Held 2006, 13), and that 
whereas pre-modern states legitimated their origin and development with divine will, in 
modern democracies this function is largely assumed by public opinion.   
The degree of government responsiveness, however, as well as the extent and degree of 
citizens’ political participation are debatable. Some theorists demand that collective 
decisions should always be based on the preferences of citizens, while others see that it 
might even be harmful for the political procedure to include citizens in it. Joel Schumpeter 
believes that citizens are capable of forming deliberated and informed opinions mostly 
about their own private circle of life, not about vast national or international issues. 
According to him, citizens often become emotional and even childish when confronted 
by political issues, and are thus incapable of using reason. And neither social status nor 
high levels of education increase their ability to understand and analyse political issues. 
Given this, Schumpeter was rather sceptic about public political participation. (Setälä 
2003, 61-62.) In contrast, Dahl states that every adult is the best person to evaluate his/her 
own well-being or interests (ibid., 86). Dahl maintains that effective participation (i.e. 
that every member of the society will have equal and effective opportunities for making 
their views known regarding policy-making) is a basic criterion of any democratic process 
6 
 
because of the necessity of political equality. (Dahl 1998, 37, 62.) Although there is some 
disagreement as to how much of a role the public should play in the design of a regime’s 
policies, it is widely agreed that policy, in political regimes, should rest on public opinion 
at least to some extent (Glynn et al. 1999, 6).  
Public opinion plays an important role also at the European level. Although traditionally 
the European project was seen as elite-driven, and public opinion therefore unimportant, 
recent research has shown that citizens do in fact play an important role in the integration 
process, since they have the ability and willingness to constrain and possibly forestall 
further progress towards a unified Europe. (Anderson 1998, 569-570.) The willingness of 
the people has already been manifested on several occasions, for instance through the 
Dutch and French 'no' in the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 and the Irish 
‘no’ to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008. It can be therefore argued that public attitudes 
provide at least a part of the political foundation for European integration. Moreover, 
since EU law lacks supranational means of enforcement, the endurance of the EU political 
system depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU law. (Gabel 1998a, 
333.) 
Some scholars are sceptical about citizens’ abilities to have a well-informed opinion about 
the European integration. Anderson (1998) states that European citizens have relatively 
low levels of information regarding European Union. In his view, the EU is a “complex 
political phenomenon that often appears removed from domestic political reality” 
(Anderson 1998, 574). Therefore, citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about 
domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration 
process. However, recent research has also shown that citizens’ support towards the 
European Union is often driven by individual-level predictors (see Arnold et al. 2012, 
Braun et al. 2014).  
It has also been argued that citizens generally do not have consistent beliefs on policy 
issues. In the context of the EU, this view maintains that the EU publics should thus be 
disregarded altogether in European policy formation (Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996, 
178). However, it can also be argued that although this might have been the case once, it 
is not so anymore. The changed socio-economic characteristics of the European societies 
have resulted in a change in the publics of Europe, and increased educational 
opportunities means a growth in political skills and resources, which in turn produces a 
more sophisticated public. (Dalton 2008, 8.) 
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1.3 Public euroscepticism in Finland: Background and research to date 
The Finnish government applied for membership of the European Community in March 
1992. The Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) decided in favour of membership on 18th 
November 1994, and on the 1st of January 1995, Finland became a member of the 
European Community, along with Austria and Sweden. The political debate on Finland’s 
possible membership in the (then) European Community took place during fall 1991 and 
early winter 1992. A referendum on Finland’s membership of the European Community 
was held on October 16th, 1994, with a (then) relatively low turnout of 71 %. While a 
clear majority of 57 % were in favour of the membership, there was also wide opposition 
to EC membership (European Election Database). It is worth noting, however, that the 
‘no’ campaign remained largely heterogeneous in terms of social and political groups. 
Within the political spectrum, the two political parties unanimously in favour of the 
membership were the conservative National Coalition (Kok.) and the leftist Social 
Democrats (SDP). The Finnish Centre Party (Kesk.) and the Green Alliance (Vihr.) were 
internally deeply divided by the issue, and the two parties against EC membership were 
the Left Alliance (VAS) and the Christian Union (now Christian Democrats, KD).   
The strongest opposition can roughly be divided into three groups. First, there were 
arguments that stressed the potential loss of Finnish independence. National 
independence and state sovereignty are both traditionally very important values in Finnish 
society and were an integral part of Finnish neutrality policy for decades after World War 
II. This argument was based on political and judicial factors. In political terms it was 
argued that Finland would only be of minor political importance in comparison to other 
EU member states. In judicial terms, it was feared that membership would violate the 
legislative and judicial powers of the Finnish parliament and courts, and could therefore 
be viewed as a violation of the Finnish Constitution. It was also debated whether 
membership would contradict Finnish neutrality politics itself. (Tiilikainen 1996, 121-
122.)  
Second, there were wide concerns that potential membership would undermine and even 
reduce the high levels of social and political equality, both in terms of civil rights and 
welfare provision. These concerns were especially evident within women who feared that 
membership would force a deterioration in their social and employment rights. The third 
- and perhaps the fiercest - group of opposition towards membership was formed by rural 
dwellers. Farmers particularly were against membership, fearing that they would lose 
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their profession and thus their means of income. Despite the fact that farmers represented 
only 6 % of the entire Finnish population, they maintained a prominent and influential 
position within Finnish politics through the Centre Party (Kesk.). Farmers pursued every 
possible channel in order to prevent Finland from joining the EC. This resulted also in the 
great intra-party divide of the leading cabinet party, the Finnish Centre. (Ibid., 120-122.) 
As for the supporters, they stressed the importance of Finnish and Western identities, 
security politics and economic factors. They maintained that membership would be a 
logical progression of Finland’s ‘return back to Europe’, and that Finnish politics had 
always been associated with Western values of liberal democracy and market economy. 
Moreover, it was important to underline that membership would endanger neither Finnish 
neutrality policy nor bilateral relations with Russia, which had been very important in 
Finland for decades.  
For the most part, Finns supported the official foreign policy, although specific attitudes 
are mostly unknown, due to the fact that there were so few public opinion surveys which 
questioned the actual details of official policy. Teija Tiilikainen argues that the high levels 
of support were in large part due to the high levels of ignorance among the Finnish public 
at the time. Only the politicisation of the membership issue after 1991 activated the 
Finnish public to formulate its own views on the issue, which in turn lead to a growth in 
negative opinion and a decrease in levels of ignorance. Nevertheless, the public opinion 
on EC (and later EU) membership remained largely positive during the first two years of 
membership, and the most notable concerns regarding membership disappeared from the 
Finnish political debate. (Tiilikainen 1996, 124-131.) 
As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, the theoretical literature as well as the empirical 
research on (public) euroscepticism is very scattered and inconsistent in nature, which 
makes it a challenging object of study. This may also be one of the reasons why the 
phenomenon has not been widely studied in Finland. Finland is also often left out in 
comparative studies of public euroscepticism. However, numerous studies have been 
conducted on public euroscepticism and (negative) attitudes towards the European Union 
in several EU member states as well as in other European countries, such as aspiring 
member states. It is therefore quite surprising that there is such little research conducted 
about Finland. In fact, public euroscepticism has almost completely been ignored in the 
field of Finnish EU research, and the focal point of research on Finnish euroscepticism 
has mainly been on the position of Finnish political parties towards the EU, with a 
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secondary minor focus on the differences between Finnish political parties and their 
respective electorate (see Raunio 2002a, Raunio 2005, Mattila & Raunio 2006, Mattila & 
Raunio 2012), or the role of the media (Vallaste 2013). 
The Finnish way of working  within the European Union has been described as 
“pragmatic and constructive, with Finnish politicians and civil servants normally 
portrayed as cooperative and committed to work in the EU institutions” (Raunio 2005, 
382). Finland’s European policy has indeed been very pro-European: Finland was one of 
the first ones to join the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and is thus 
the only Nordic country to adopt the single currency. Finland has also played an active 
role in the further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
More recently, Finland has played an active role in the financial sector during the financial 
crisis in the late 2000’s and 2010’s. Hence, Finland has often been characterized as the 
model student of the Union, always willing to comply with common rules and obligations, 
and all governments since 1995 have stressed the importance of being present where 
decisions concerning Finland are made. 
Curiously enough, the general public has not always followed the incumbent governments 
in this apparent euro-enthusiasm. Although over 57 % of the population was in favor of 
the EU membership in the national referendum held in 1994, Raunio (2005, 385) shows 
that between 1994 and 2003, Finns have been less supportive of the EU membership than 
average EU citizen. Also, Finland appears to be the only EU member state with high 
levels of public euroscepticism and low levels of party based euroscepticism (Taggart & 
Szczerbiak 2002). Braun & Tausendpfund (2014) find that support for the EU is below 
average in Finland. However, they only use one indicator (image of the EU) as basis for 
this conclusion. 
Mattila and Raunio have discovered that the average Finnish voter is more eurosceptic 
than any Finnish political party, except for Left Alliance (VAS) and Finns Party (PS). 
They also conclude that many Finns think that Finnish political parties tend to have too 
positive attitudes towards EU. Those who are more critical towards the EU tend not to 
vote in European parliamentary elections, although they vote in national elections. One 
reason for this might be the small variety of eurosceptic political parties in the Finnish 
political arena. (Mattila & Raunio 2005, 35-37.) However, refrain from voting in 
European parliamentary elections does not necessarily constitute euroscepticism, but it 
may well be a manifestation of normal political contestation at the European level. 
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Furthermore, current research on Finnish voting behavior does not reveal the reasons why 
citizens refrain from voting in the European Parliament elections.  
The Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) has conducted annual Value and Attitude 
Surveys in Finland since 1984. These surveys touch upon attitudes towards social issues 
in Finland, such as the market economy and issues related to work life, as well as attitudes 
towards the European Union. Although they do not provide in-depth analysis of the 
reasons behind Finnish euroscepticism, these surveys do offer some insight on public 
support – or the lack thereof - towards the European Union. 
According to EVA’s report from 2014, general support towards the Union has remained 
rather constant throughout the membership, fluctuating between 33 % (2006) and 55 % 
(2012), whereas negative attitudes towards the Union have been between 24 % (2014) 
and 35 % (2000 and 2007). Neutral opinion has also remained somewhat constant, 25-34 
%, and only on average about 1,6 % of the respondents could not state their opinion, 
which indicates that  Finns have strong feelings toward membership in general. 
Socioeconomic factors behind negative support have not varied much either. Middle-aged 
men with low education who live in small towns and vote for the Finns Party (PS), or 
refrain from voting tend to dislike the Union most. However, despite the general positivity 
towards the Union, the report also perceives a more critical stance. Only 11 % say their 
view on the Union has become more positive during the recent years and as many as 26 
% even out of those who in general favor the Union have in fact become more critical 
towards it. (Haavisto 2014, 97-100.) 
Haavisto does not much ponder the reasons behind the attitudes towards the European 
Union, but suggests they are due to the slight improvement of the monetary crisis, and 
Finland’s changed position in the EU, as Finland is experiencing severe financial 
difficulties. (Ibid., 100-101.) Haavisto therefore implies that the respondents are using 
national proxies in order to determine their attitudes towards the Union. Furthermore, he 
suggests that financial aspects matter when determining one’s support towards the 
European Union. 
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2 Defining the key concepts 
2.1 European Union 
There are quite a few notions on what European Union is, or what is meant by European 
integration. It has been described – inter alia - as an international organization (Haas 
1958), a set of intergovernmental institutions (Moravcsik 1998), a regulatory state 
(Majone 1996), a type of multi-level governance (Hooghe & Marks 2005), an institution 
sui generis, and as a political system (Hix 2005). This thesis holds that that the European 
Union can be defined as a political system and thus maintains that public opinion is a 
plausible object of study within the context of the European Union. 
Gabriel A. Almond (1956) and David Easton (1957, 1965a) were the first to establish 
formal framework for defining and analysing political systems. To them, political systems 
are characterised by four elements:  
 
1. A stable and clearly defined set of institutions for decision-making and a set of 
rules which govern the relations between and within these institutions. 
2. Citizens and social groups seek to realise their political desires through the 
political system, usually through intermediary organisations such as interest 
groups and political parties. 
3. Collective decisions have a significant impact on the distribution of economic 
resources and the allocation of social and political values across the whole system 
4. There is continuous interaction (feedback) between political outputs, new 
demands on the system, and new decisions. 
 
Hix (2005, 3-4) finds that all the above mentioned characteristics can indeed be found 
within the European Union. First, the Union has a clear set of institutions (the 
Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice), established 
as early as in the 1950’s, that possess a great amount of executive, legislative and judicial 
power. Moreover, there are several treaties (namely the Maastricht Treaty 1993, the 
Amsterdam Treaty 1999, the Nice Treaty 2003 and the Lisbon Treaty 2009) that have 
produced a highly evolved system of rules and procedures governing how these powers 
are exercised by the EU institutions. 
Second, as EU institutions have gained more power, there are an increasing number of 
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interest groups from the business sector, trade unions, environmental and consumer 
groups and political parties attempting to make demands on the system. Furthermore, 
although the member states are the most influential actors within the European Union, 
they do not have a monopoly on political demands, but as in all democratic regimes, 
demands in the EU arise from a complex network of public and private groups, competing 
to influence the EU policy process to promote or protect their interests.  
Third, the decisions made at the EU level are significant and affect European citizens. EU 
policies cover virtually all areas of public policy, including market regulation, the 
environment, human rights, consumer affairs, transport, education, and culture. 
Moreover, the EU is gradually taking over in policy areas traditionally seen as belonging 
to national competence, such as taxation, immigration, social policy, foreign policy and 
defence policy. Also, on average more than 100 pieces of legislation pass through the EU 
institutions every year, and member states have to acknowledge the supremacy of EU law 
over national law. Finally, there is a complex web of interactions within and between EU 
institutions in Brussels, between national governments and Brussels, within the various 
departments in national governments, in bilateral meetings of national governments, and 
between private interest groups and government officials both in Brussels and at the 
national level.  
European Union cannot be considered as a (Westphalian) state in the traditional Weberian 
sense, as it does not have the legitimate monopoly of physical coercion over a given 
territory or population. This power is still in the hands of individual member states. 
However, Hix points out that “…the state is simply a product of a particular structure of 
political, economic and social relations in Western Europe between the sixteenth and mid-
twentieth centuries […] in a different environment government and politics could be 
undertaken without the classic apparatus of a state” (Hix 2005, 3). Thus, European 
integration has produced a new form of political system, capable to function without a 
complete transformation of the territorial organisation of the state. 
The terms European Union and European integration are used interchangeably in this 
thesis. European integration has two dimensions: Deeper integration refers to an increase 
in the number of political issues under EU competence, on the one hand, and to the 
reinforcement of the Union’s supranational characteristics, on the other. Wider integration 
refers to the increase in the number of countries that join the Union. (Tiilikainen & 
Palosaari 2007, 14.) I also utilize the term ‘integration process’ to highlight the fact that 
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the integration is an ongoing phenomenon, which may inspire changing public attitudes 
depending on the type and direction of integration in focus at a particular time (Sørensen 
2007, 31). 
2.2 Public opinion 
The concept of public opinion is challenging to define partly because of the volatile nature 
of the term ‘public’. The volatility stems from the fact that many researchers from 
different disciplines have contributed to the study of public opinion with very different 
methodologies and assumptions. Furthermore, the meaning of public opinion is tied to its 
historical context – the type of political culture and the importance of public participation 
in the everyday work of the government. (Glynn et al. 1999, 14-15.) 
Sociological theorization conceptualizes ‘the public’ as a loosely organized collective or 
group emerging in a rational discussion, which is very difficult to identify as a specific 
group. To understand the concept of the public, the term has often been defined in contrast 
with two other loosely related terms, namely the crowd and the mass. Accordingly, Robert 
E. Park has defined the public as a specific social group opposite to the crowd. In a crowd, 
individuals join together unconsciously, without reflection, acting upon impulse, whereas 
joining a public necessitates a critical discussion (Park 1967, 229). The mass, on the other 
hand, is defined by the people’s interpersonal isolation. Sociologist Herbert Blumer does 
not define the public as the opposite of the crowd but rather as the opposite of the mass, 
which consists of anonymous individuals who engage in very little interaction or 
communication (Blumer 2000, 343). While belonging to a crowd simply requires the 
ability to feel and empathize with others, belonging to a public requires the ability to think 
and reason with others over a certain issue. Blumer defines the public as a group of people 
a) who are confronted by an issue, b) who are divided in the ideas as to how to meet the 
issue, and c) who engage in discussion over the issue. Although the public is self-aware 
(Glynn et al. 1999, 15-16), it occurs as a spontaneous response to an issue; it doesn’t exist 
in an organized form (Splichal 1999, 10).  
All individuals have an idea of how things are (beliefs) and how things ought to be 
(values). Beliefs are the understanding that individuals have about objects or actions, and 
they are often difficult to identify. Values, on the other hand, are ideals, and so they 
represent the understanding of how things ought to be. Built upon our beliefs and values 
there are attitudes, positive or negative feelings toward a given thing. When these attitudes 
14 
 
are expressed they become opinions. To put it differently, attitudes are predispositions to 
respond, and opinions are the responses. Subsequently, public opinion can be defined as 
an aggregation of individual opinions and an articulated response by a group of people 
confronted by an issue after discussing it.1 (Glynn et al. 1999, 17, 104-107.) 
2.3 Euroscepticism 
The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘scepticism’ as “doubt or incredulity as to the truth 
of some assertion or supposed fact” (Oxford 2015). As for the concept of euroscepticism, 
there is a whole range of terms that are used to capture the phenomenon, and these terms 
are presented with very little specification as to what they actually mean (Kopecký & 
Mudde 2002, 299, Sørensen 2007, Kaniok 2012). Euroscepticism is a multifaceted term, 
and it has been used in many different ways and in several contexts. This is perhaps due 
to the fact that there are different types or dimensions of euroscepticism, ranging from 
fundamental rejections of European integration in its present form through to mild 
reformist critiques. Euroscepticism also markedly varies from country to country, and 
therefore the lack of support towards the EU does not necessarily apply to the same 
dimensions European integration in each country (Harmsen & Spiering 2004, Leconte 
2010). Moreover, the meaning of euroscepticism varies across time, as it evolves in 
parallel to the successive developments of the EU (Leconte 2010, 4). Because of the 
ambiguous nature of euroscepticism, it is a rich and versatile of study, on the one hand, 
but has simultaneously proven to be problematic for scholars to define, operationalise and 
comprehend, on the other hand. 
Indeed, the lack of satisfaction with the European Union has assumed many labels which 
are rarely specified in detail – eurocriticism, euroscepticism, EU-scepticism, eurorealism 
and europessimism among others.  The fundamental problem with these concepts is that 
they sometimes denote sceptics of the EU as a whole, but are also frequently used in 
relation to specific areas of concern, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the 
Constitutional Treaty. (Sørensen 2007, 56-58.) 
To Taggart (1998), opposition to and support for the EU are rarely either binary or 
absolute, and euroscepticism incorporates three different positions towards the EU. First, 
                                                 
1 Here, discussing does not necessarily mean an actual conversation or a public discourse over an issue. It 
can also simply refer to personal reflection.  
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there is the anti-integration position of those who oppose the very idea of European 
integration and as a consequence oppose the EU. Second, there are those who do not 
oppose to European integration on principle, but are sceptical that the EU is the best form 
of integration because it is too inclusive. This group includes for example those who see 
the integration as a gateway to increased immigration. Finally, the last group consists of 
those who are sceptical that the EU is the best form of integration because it is too 
exclusive, either geographically or socially. From these premises he deducts a definition 
of euroscepticism that is probably the most renowned in theoretical literature. For him, 
the term euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well 
as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European 
integration (ibid. 1998, 366, emphasis added). Euroscepticism exists in the face of an on-
going de facto process of integration at the institutional and elite level. Taggart maintains 
that the term euroscepticism encompasses those who stand outside the status quo. 
Together with Aleks Szczerbiak, Taggart has distinguished two dimensions of 
euroscepticism, and has produced a working typology of hard and soft euroscepticism 
(see Szczerbiak & Taggart 2002).  
Catharina Sørensen has attempted to show how a more careful conceptualisation can 
reduce public euroscepticism to relatively few types (Sørensen 2008, 5). She defines 
euroscepticism in a broad, inclusive manner, therefore including within the concept 
sentiments that are sceptical towards part of the ”EU of the day”, whilst still being 
supportive towards the issue of membership and/or a strong European Union. She thus 
rejects the distinction between outright rejection on the other hand and 'constructive 
criticism' on the other. Sørensen also perceives the term as multifaceted, where 'euro' 
includes the possibility of euroscepticism being directed against European cooperation as 
a whole, as well as towards specific formulations for cooperation proposed by the EU. 
'Scepticism' is taken to be variable and include outright opposition. Sørensen assumes 
most citizens to be eurosceptic to some extent, which leads to the necessity of measuring 
the intensity and durability of the phenomenon. The term scepticism is understood as 
sentiments of disapproval. From these premises Sørensen deducts her definition of 
euroscepticism as sentiment of disapproval – reaching a certain degree and durability – 
directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy areas or 
developments. 'Eurosceptic public opinion' refers to citizens perceiving faults or 
shortcomings with regard to the EU-of-the-day. (Sørensen 2007, 10, 61-62, emphasis in 
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original.) Sørensen’s definition is also adopted in this thesis, as it is compatible with the 
notion of different levels of support toward the European Union, which I will study in 
more detail later on.  
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3 Theoretical conceptualisations of euroscepticism 
There have been some attempts to conceptualise and to group different aspects of 
euroscepticism in the theoretical literature. For example, Lubbers & Scheepers (2005) 
have separated instrumental and political euroscepticism. Instrumental euroscepticism 
refers to opposition toward EU in general (membership – bad, feeling of benefit – no 
benefit), whereas political euroscepticism entails scepticism toward particular EU 
policies. Haesly (2001) has made a distinction between eurosceptics, europhiles, and 
instrumental Europeans in a study of Scotland and Wales. National attitudes (Semetko et 
al. 2003), lack of support for the euro (Banducci et al, 2003) and general euroscepticism 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2005) have also been mentioned as sources for (negative) public 
opinion towards the European Union. The problem with these studies is the lack of clear 
conceptualization of the European Union on the one hand, and the term euroscepticism, 
on the other. Therefore, we will take a closer look at the more rigorous and all-
encompassing attempts to conceptualise euroscepticism.  
3.1 Hard vs. soft euroscepticism 
Taggart & Szczerbiak have developed a widely cited conceptualization of party-based 
euroscepticism. According to Paul Taggart (1998, 365-366), euroscepticism incorporates 
three different positions towards the EU, as already discussed in the previous chapter. 
First, there are those who oppose the very idea of the European integration and 
subsequently the EU. Taggart calls this the anti-integration position. Second, there are 
people who are not opposed to European integration in principle but are nevertheless 
sceptical towards the inclusiveness of the EU. In other words, the EU is trying to force 
together elements that are too diverse to be compatible. Finally there are those who see 
the EU as too exclusive, either geographically or socially.  
Taggart's definition of euroscepticism, then, is broad in the sense that it encompasses all 
those who stand outside the status quo (Taggart 1998, 366). To elaborate the term, Taggart 
and Szczerbiak (2002) have broken the definition into two and have thus created a 
working typology of hard and soft euroscepticism, which differentiates between those 
who are broadly opposed to the EU on principle and those who oppose the European 
integration because of the form it takes. Soft euroscepticism is defined as the contingent 
or qualified opposition to European integration. It is contingent in the sense that it does 
not imply opposition to integration on principled grounds but suggests that if there were 
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alterations to either a policy area or a shift in the national interest European integration in 
its current form could be supported or even encouraged. Hard euroscepticism, on the other 
hand, implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic 
integration as well as opposition to a country joining or remaining member of the EU. It 
is to be noted, however, that hard euroscepticism reflects the principled objection to the 
current form of European integration. The principled objection comes from the view that 
the EU stands against deeply held values, or that it is the embodiment of some values that 
are perceived as negative. (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002, 27-28.) Although Taggart and 
Szczerbiak's definition is directed towards party-based, or organised, euroscepticism, the 
fundamental distinction between contingent and principled scepticism should be directly 
transferable also to the public level (Sørensen 2007, 59).  
Jan Rovny (2004) has also studied euroscepticism at the political party level. He criticises 
Taggart and Szczerbiak's typology for being too simplistic. It “creates merely two 
additionally unspecified categories of eurosceptics, each of which collects differing 
cases” (Rovny 2004, 33). Instead, Rovny suggests that there are different degrees of both 
categories of euroscepticism. He proposes that there can be different levels of hard 
euroscepticism. Although by definition all hard eurosceptics oppose the EU in principle, 
there can still be substantial differences in the importance that opposition to the EU plays 
in their program or discourse, as well as in the sharpness of their anti-EU rhetoric. 
Consequently, the magnitude of euroscepticism can be seen as a continuum stretching 
from the limits of soft euroscepticism to the limits of hard euroscepticism. According to 
Rovny, the key question is whether euroscepticism (hard or soft) is ideological or 
strategic. Predominantly ideologically driven eurosceptics are likely to take up 
euroscepticism because it is somehow implied in their original ideological positions. 
Predominantly strategically driven eurosceptics use euroscepticism as a pragmatic 
addition to their original program. (Ibid., 33-37.) 
3.2 Diffuse vs. specific support 
Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde have criticised Taggart and Szczerbiak's definition for 
being too inclusive, and see four weaknesses in their elaboration. First, soft 
euroscepticism is defined in such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with 
any policy decision of the EU can be included. Second, what seems to be an apparent and 
clear distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' euroscepticism is later blurred. Third, the criteria 
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that are used both to connect and to separate the two forms of euroscepticism remain 
unclear, leaving it therefore difficult to explain why different forms of euroscepticism 
appear. Fourth, the very categories of 'hard' and 'soft' do not do enough justice to the subtle 
distinction between the ideas of European integration, on the one hand, and the European 
Union, on the other. As a result, they see the term euroscepticism “wrongly ascribed to 
parties and ideologies that are in essence pro-European as well as to those that are outright 
anti-European”. (Kopecký & Mudde 2002, 299-300.) 
Instead, they propose an alternative way of categorising opposition to the EU by defining 
the term euroscepticism in relation to other (party) positions on 'Europe'. Euroscepticism 
is defined less inclusively but more precisely. They draw on David Easton's (1965b) 
seminal distinction between different forms of support for political regimes by 
distinguishing between two dimensions of support towards European integration, namely 
diffuse and specific. Diffuse support is the support for the general ideas of European 
integration that underlie the EU. Specific support means the support for the general 
practice of European integration, i.e. the EU as it is and as it is developing. (Kopecký & 
Mudde 2002, 300, emphasis in original.)  
The first dimension, support for the ideas of European integration, separates the 
Europhiles from the Europhobes. Europhiles believe in the core ideas of the EU: the 
political and the economic union, regardless of how European integration is defined and 
realised in detail. Europhobes do not support (and even oppose) these general ideas, 
perhaps due to differing ideologies (nationalism, socialism or isolationism), or simply 
because they believe that European integration is not possible due to the diversity that 
exist among European nation-states. Therefore they fail to support one or more of the 
ideas underlying European integration. (Ibid., 301.) 
The second dimension of the typology, 'support for the European Union', separates the 
EU-optimists from the EU-pessimists. EU-optimists believe in the EU as it is and as it is 
developing, either because they are satisfied with the way it has been set up and is 
running, or because they are optimistic about the direction of development of the EU. EU-
pessimists do not support the EU as it is at the moment, or are pessimistic about the 
direction of its development. However, they do not necessarily outright oppose or reject 
EU membership, but they hope to change the EU so that it would reflect their own 
founding ideas of the integration.  
These two dimensions form four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe: 
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 Euroenthusiasts combine Europhile and EU-optimist positions. They support the 
general ideas of European integration and believe that the EU is or will soon 
become the institutionalisation of these ideas.  
 Eurosceptics combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions, and support the 
general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the EU's current 
and/or future reflection of these ideas.  
 Eurorejects combine Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions. They reject both the 
ideas underlying the process of European integration and the EU as such.  
 Finally, there are Europragmatists who combine Europhobe and EU-optimist 
positions. They do not support the general ideas underlying the integration 
process, although they do not necessarily oppose them either, but they are still in 
favour of the EU as such. Furthermore, this group generally consists of parties 
that do not hold a firm ideological opinion on European integration. Their position 
is rather based on pragmatic (and often utilitarian) considerations. (Ibid., 302-
303.) 
 
Table 1: Typology of party positions on Europe (Kopecký & Mudde 2002). 
 
Euroscepticism can take different forms and shapes, depending on different 
interpretations on the EU, but Kopecký & Mudde maintain that all Eurosceptics are also 
Europhile: They are not against advantageous cooperation between European groups for 
peace and prosperity. (Ibid., 304).  Kopecký & Mudde also include the dimensions of 
ideology and strategy into their model, stating that ideology plays a greater role in party-
based attitudes towards the EU on the one hand, and European integration on the other 
hand.  
In Kopecký & Mudde's typology, ”eurorejects” would then correspond to the 'hard' 
euroscepticism in  Taggart and Szczerbiak's conceptualisation, invoking a principled 
opposition to the EU and European integration, while the other three categories allow for 
a more contingent, or 'soft' scepticism. This typology, however, can also be reproached 
for being too inclusive, and it leaves room for confusion as to when the concept of 
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euroscepticism is used to refer to the EU as a whole or to a single issue or policy. 
(Sørensen 2007, 60.) Also, specific support for Kopecký & Mudde refers to the general 
practice of the European Union, but they fail to define more accurately what that general 
practice entails. The conceptualization is too broad, for ‘general practice’ can refer to 
institutions and their performance, the shifting of policy competence from national to EU 
level,  the decisions made within the EU and their effect on citizens, or the organization 
of feedback within the European Union.  
3.3 The 'thin' typology 
Flood & Usherwood note that although Kopecký & Mudde have produced a more 
sophisticated set of classifications than the soft/hard model, their typology has the 
disadvantage of reducing ideology as if it were a mere binary opposition between 
europhile and europhobe attitudes towards an ideal of European integration, when in fact 
the concept of integration is far more complex. They also criticise Kopecký & Mudde for 
blurring the distinction between EU as a developing system of institutions, policies and 
practices, on one hand, and Europe as a geographically situated set of peoples grouped in 
states, on the other. This confusion in turn leads to the misconception that Euroscepticism 
for Kopecký & Mudde would mean scepticism towards Europe. (Flood & Usherwood 
2007, 4.) 
Flood & Usherwood have also studied European political parties and offer yet another 
approach to classifying euroscepticism at political party level. They suggest six categories 
into which positions towards the EU's development, either as a totality or in some 
particular policy area(s) can be summarised, from most positive to most negative. 
Therefore, it could be seen as 'intensity' table of alignments.  
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Table 2: Categories of EU alignments (Flood & Usherwood, 2007). 
 
This is a ‘thin’ typology. The categories are therefore not intended to convey any 
suggestion of a specific content to the positions described, beyond basic stances towards 
the EU, and there are no presumptions as to ideological orientation, strategic calculations 
or tactical manoeuvres. (Flood & Usherwood 2007, 6.) 
Although the typology has originally been designed to describe euroscepticism of more 
organised groups, it could possibly be applied to the public in general because of its broad 
attitudinal positioning towards the EU. There are, however, some problems with this 
classification too. Szczerbiak and Taggart point out that political parties or individuals 
rarely elaborate their attitudes in such detail that they may adequately fit this schema. 
Also, Flood & Usherwood (2005) have themselves admitted that the categories are not 
mutually exclusive – a party may be revisionist with regard to one policy, rejectionist with 
regard to another, but reformist in its overall position. (Sørensen 2007, 60-61.) 
3.4 Ideal types of euroscepticism 
Catharina Sørensen (2007) has established four ideal types of euroscepticism, deducted 
from Standard Eurobarometer poll questions between 1973 and 2005. Four indicators (i.e. 
Eurobarometer questions) form each type of public euroscepticism, as is shown below. 
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 Type of euroscepticism Indicators  
 
Utilitarian: Economic benefit 
General benefit from membership  
 Meaning of the EU: A waste of money  
 Specific benefits from membership in economic areas  
 Role of the EU: Negative role in the economic situation  
 
Sovereignty-based 
euroscepticism 
Against the formation of a European government  
 
Against the EU constitution because of loss of national 
sovereignty  
 The end of national cultural identities and their diversity  
 For national level decision-making  
 
Democratic euroscepticism 
Dissatisfaction of EU democracy  
 
Against the EU constitution because it’s not democratic 
enough  
 European Community little or not at all democratic  
 Interest not very well or not at all protected  
 
Social euroscepticism 
Against EU priorities in social matters  
 Against the EU constitution because it’s not social enough  
 Fear of the loss of social benefits  
Table 3: The indicators of types of euroscepticism (Sørensen 2007). 
 
Economic euroscepticism represents scepticism towards the perceived inability of the EU 
to bring tangible benefits, both at macro and micro level. Sovereignty-based 
euroscepticism describes the threats posed by the EU to the continued relevance, integrity 
and identity of the nation-state. It is the form of scepticism towards political developments 
that are thought to have a negative impact on national sovereignty.  Democratic 
euroscepticism is scepticism towards perceived democratic shortcomings in the EU. 
Finally, social euroscepticism is citizens' scepticism towards the EU's social engagement. 
(Sørensen 2007, 137-139.) 
Sørensen also includes a dimension of hard euroscepticism in her typology, measured 
with the following Eurobarometer questions: 
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Table 4: The indicators of hard euroscepticism (Sørensen 2007). 
 
Sørensen assumes that the structures of hard and soft euroscepticism are similar, but that 
they are distinguished by their intensity. Thus, hard euroscepticism is distinct in the extent 
of its degree of rejectionism. While soft euroscepticism in theory could be changed into 
a permissive consensus, if the specific object of scepticism were to be rectified, hard 
euroscepticism is more persistent, and therefore hard eurosceptics may ontologically 
constitute a distinct group of citizens. (Sørensen 2007, 62-63.) 
Sørensen’s typology is not unproblematic either. On a theoretical level, it is distinguished 
because of the rigorous conceptualisation of the different types of euroscepticism, but the 
execution of the study could be more eloquent. The validity of the chosen indicators is 
not certain, and given the nature of the Eurobarometer polls, her study would most likely 
prove laborious to repeat. Also, the data does not allow for all indicators to be traced over 
a long period of time, although Sørensen treats the data in a very longitudinal manner. 
Some questions used as indicators are posed only once, and some types of euroscepticism 
(namely social and democratic) were discovered by Eurobarometer only during the past 
decade.   
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4 Empirical research on euroscepticism 
The evolving nature of the EC (later the EU) has largely been reflected in academic 
studies on public euroscepticism. Scholars have therefore focused on different underlying 
reasons behind euroscepticism at different times. In the early decades of integration, 
utility-based explanations dominated alongside the hypothesis of post-materialist support 
developed in the Silent Revolution theory. After the ratification crisis of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the mid 1990’s, theories about protest voting, the democratic deficit and 
concerns about national sovereignty and identity became dominant. More recently, ideas 
that euroscepticism reflects domestic political contestation on a right/left cleavage are 
also gaining more ground.  
The growing political importance of euroscepticism has prompted a growth in the 
scholarly literature on the subject (Harmsen & Spiering 2004, 18). Moreover, the 
literature concerned with identifying specific types of euroscepticism is marked by 
tremendous diversity, in terms of object of study, level of analysis as well as methodology, 
and this diversity has subsequently resulted in scattered and inconsistent knowledge 
within the field of study (Sørensen 2007, 65-67), as well as in contradicting results. 
Nevertheless, the following chapters present an overview of the empirical research done 
within the study of euroscepticism. 
4.1 Ideological euroscepticism 
Up to the mid 1990's and the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was essentially a means to 
institutionalise market integration, and analyses of public opinion reflected this (Hooghe 
& Marks 2005, 426). Research was mainly concerned with economic costs and benefits.  
An interesting deviation from the norm is Ronald Inglehart's thesis of the Silent 
Revolution introduced in 1971. It was possibly the most used theory to explain public 
feelings towards European integration prior to the Maastricht Treaty (Sørensen 2007, 88). 
Joseph Janssen stated in 1991 that it was frequently cited as 'the' explanation for public 
support (or the lack thereof) in Europe (Janssen 1991, 444). In Inglehart's view, what 
constitutes euroscepticism is value-based or ideological contestation about the nature of 
the EU. 
Inglehart's theory is based on the assumption that a transformation is about to take place 
in the political cultures of advanced industrial societies, and that this transformation 
appears to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations as a result of changing 
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conditions influencing their basic socialisation. Inglehart assumes that individuals have a 
tendency to retain a given value hierarchy throughout adult life, once a basic character 
has been formed during childhood and youth. He hypothesises that the degree of 
economic security an individual feels during the 'formative' years may play a key role in 
shaping his later political behaviour. (Inglehart 1971, 991.)   
Janssen distinguishes two variables in Inglehart's model of attitude-formation at the 
individual level: political value-orientations and the level of political skills. Materialists 
give the highest priority to things related to economic and physical security, whereas post-
materialists give priority to things that are more directed to the fulfilment of a person's 
intellectual needs. In this sense, the issue of European integration fits in better with the 
value-orientation of post-materialists than with that of materialists for two reasons. 
Firstly, materialists are preoccupied with material needs and have less time to devote to 
abstract issues like the European integration. Materialists are also less cosmopolitan than 
post-materialists. Therefore, post-materialists are supposed to be more committed to 
European integration. Secondly, post-materialists are more eager to fulfil a certain need 
for belonging, and turn to the EC because they find the nation-state too materialist. 
(Janssen 1991, 444-445.)  
The second variable is the level of political skills. According to Inglehart, post-bourgeois 
(post-materialist) values should be most prevalent among those who currently enjoy a 
relatively high socio-economic status, acquired through education. The lower socio-
economic groups are much more likely to select acquisitive value priorities than are the 
upper socio-economic groups. (Inglehart 1971, 1001.) This process Inglehart calls 
'cognitive mobilisation'. Cognitive mobilisation depicts that more citizens have the 
political resources and skills necessary to deal with the complexities of politics and to 
reach their own political decisions (Dalton 2008, 21). One of the key consequences of 
cognitive mobilisation is an increasing ability to relate to abstract information. Since the 
processing of information on European integration is assumed to require high skills of 
abstraction, it is also assumed that those who have acquired a higher education would be 
more supportive of the integration process. (Inglehart 1970, 47.) Sørensen points out that 
the presumed importance of higher education could account for the frequently cited 
distinction between elite and public support for the EU (Sørensen 2007, 88).  
At the meso level, Inglehart's theory presupposes that pre-war and post-war generations 
differ significantly with respect to value-orientations and political skills because both are 
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related to individual youth experiences. Improvement of the educational system and the 
increased participation in higher education after the WWII mean that the post-war 
generations on average have a higher level of skills. Moreover, the expansion of mass 
media allows post-war generations to become more aware of national and international 
politics. Furthermore, the pre-war generations have experienced war, violence and 
poverty, which results to more materialistic values, whereas post-war generations are 
prone to embrace post-materialist values. (Janssen 1991, 446.)  
4.2 Utilitarian euroscepticism 
Inglehart's thesis was widely criticised in the early 1990's for being empirically 
unfounded. Instead of explaining public euroscepticism on grounds of ideology, scholars 
now turned again to utilitarian (namely economic) factors. The utility thesis still continues 
to be a major approach in the euroscepticism literature, and the hypothesis stating that 
utilitarian motivations are decisive for citizens' opinions of the EU recurs in numerous 
studies (see Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996, Gabel & Palmer 
1995, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, McLaren 2004, Survillo et al. 2010). Tangible economic 
benefit is central to the discussions of utility. The key rationale is logically deduced: as 
the EU itself is driven by a largely economic agenda, the public evaluates the EU 
according to its economic achievements. (Sørensen 2007, 79).  
The utility perspective was already present in neofunctionalism, one of the classic theories 
of European integration. One of the key concepts of neofunctionalism is the idea of 
shifting loyalties. The deepening of the integration process can be explained by the 
shifting of loyalties of key actors from the national to the international level (Tiilikainen 
2007, 43). In terms of public support for the (then) EC, the idea was that citizens would 
also gradually shift their loyalties from the national to the European level when becoming 
aware of the functionalist, utility maximising requirements of policies. Citizen support 
was therefore seen as a function of the efficiency of the EU in producing policy. (Sørensen 
2007, 82).  
Andrew Moravcsik (1998) presented his theory of integration, liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI), in the 1990's. His theory draws from Alan Milward's idea that 
the integration process strengthens nation-states in the sense that it brings certain policies, 
previously under supranational surveillance, back under national control. In LI, the role 
of the nation-states is thus decisive. National (economic and political) interests are formed 
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at the national level, and then debated over at the European level. Member states engage 
in mutual competition, the grounds of which are determined by traditional political 
factors. Utility is the very raison d'être for cooperation: if it were not for tangible benefits, 
cooperation would not be desirable in the first place. Euroscepticism then emerges as the 
critique of the lack of benefits.  
The utilitarian approach has been studied from two main perspectives. The first one 
assumes that individual citizens engage in cost-benefit calculations, where those who gain 
– or expect to gain – from the integration will support the EU, and that the individual 
differences in economic welfare shape attitudes toward integration (Garry & Tilley 2009, 
362). Citizens with more human capital (higher education, occupational skills) are better 
situated to gain from the emerging market related opportunities and are thus more likely 
to support the EU (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996, Gabel 1995, Gabel 1998a). 
Furthermore, the free movement of goods and people within the EU influences citizens 
differently depending on their place of residence. Gabel thus argues that all things being 
equal, residents of border regions express greater support for integration than residents of 
non-border regions. (Gabel 1998, 336-337.) McLaren (2004, 896) has also found that 
utilitarian calculations and proxies do play an important role in determining where 
individuals stand on the issue of integration. 
Macroeconomic factors are also seen as important in assessing public opinion on the 
European integration. Socio-tropic utilitarianism suggests that the actual benefits received 
by the member states also have an impact on levels of support for the EU. In countries 
where the net benefits are negative, levels of support are expected to be lower than in 
countries where benefits are positive. Another collective economic benefit for member 
states is an increase in trade levels resulting from the removal of barriers to free trade. 
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, 513.) It is debatable, however, whether the average citizen 
is capable of perceiving the increase in foreign trade and whether she can affiliate it with 
membership of the EU, or whether she is able to recognise the implications of European 
integration in general, and how it affects her.  
The utility perspective thus assumes that individual citizens know how the economic 
integration works, and can assess its gains and losses relatively easily. This idea has been 
criticised by Anderson (1998), who claims that citizens use national proxies when they 
evaluate the performance of the EU because they do not have sufficient knowledge or 
information about its functions or institutions. Therefore citizens need to base their 
29 
 
opinion about the EU to something they know (i.e. incumbent government). However, 
this thesis holds that although citizens might not be capable of assessing the positive or 
negative impacts of the European integration to the nation-state, they are capable of 
distinguishing and understanding the (perceived) positive or negative impacts of the 
integration to their lives (see also Arnold et al. 2012, Braun et al. 2014). 
4.3 National identity perspective 
In the 1990's, elite conflict on Europe intensified, radical right-wing parties became the 
eurosceptic vanguard, and scholars began to analyse communal identities as sources of 
public opinion (Hooghe & Marks 2005, 427). The utilitarian understanding of public 
support for European integration was challenged by authors who pointed to national 
identity as an important explanation of (lack of) support for European integration (see for 
example Carey, 2002, Luedtke 2005, Bruter 2008, Van Klingeren et al. 2013). One 
obvious reason for the shift of focus in the study of euroscepticism was notion of 
European citizenship established by the Maastricht Treaty.  
The identity explanation draws on psychology of group membership to consider how 
national identity influences support for European integration.  Identity here is seen as an 
affective state of belonging to a social group. People make emotional evaluations of social 
groups, which can be positive (‘in-group love’) as well as negative (‘outgroup hate’). 
National identity, in turn, can be seen as reflecting emotional or affective orientations of 
individuals towards their nation and national political system. National identity is 
assumed to remain somewhat stable over time, despite utilitarian or political incentives 
for citizens to drop, add, or modify their national identities. (Luedtke 2005, 87.) Thus, the 
identity approach assumes that psychological well-being matters more than material, and 
stresses the importance of belonging to a social – and especially to a national – group, 
and that group loyalties and attachments are significant predictors of attitudes towards the 
European Union (Garry & Tilley 2009, 362). It aims to show that citizens are not merely 
homo economicus, as suggested by the utilitarian perspective. (De Vries & van 
Kersbergen 2007, 311).  
The empirical research conducted thus far has found conflicting results. Whereas some 
studies argue that regional or national identity is consistent with European identity and 
support for European integration (Haesly 2001), other research shows that national 
attachment combined with national pride have a significant negative effect on support for 
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European integration (Christin & Trechsel 2002, Carey 2002, Luedtke 2005). Moreover, 
some studies suggest that despite attempts to create a European identity alongside national 
identities, there is very little evidence of any European identity or sense of European 
citizenship, and that Europeans still appear attached to their national identity (Carey 2002, 
388). 
There is empirical evidence that euroscepticism could also be embedded in fear towards 
foreign cultures, or in a perceived threat of immigration. McLaren (2002, 553-554) finds 
that antipathy towards the EU is largely due to fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures. 
People are ultimately concerned about problems related to the degradation of their nation-
state, and citizens who are concerned about the possible degradation of the nation-state 
are likely to oppose any institution or system which could threaten it. Luedtke also 
concludes that European citizens are opposed to common European immigration policy, 
largely because supranationalisation clashes with historically rooted national identities 
(Luedtke 2005, 85). However, it must be kept in mind that while citizens with strong 
national identities might be more eurosceptic, it has also been shown that individuals can 
very well identify with several territorial communities simultaneously (Hooghe & Marks 
2004, 416). Thus it is not unusual for European citizens to have multiple identities (see 
for example Haesly 2001, Decker 2002, Risse 2002). 
The utility and the national identity perspectives have often been pitted against one 
another as mutually exclusive conceptualisations (Hooghe & Marks 2005, 419). De Vries 
and van Kersbergen (2007, 308) attempt to show, however, that both approaches merely 
capture the different sides of the same coin. The authors argue that there are theoretical 
reasons to suppose that the utilitarian approach and the identity perspective tap into the 
same causal mechanism underlying the attitudes of European public to integration and 
therefore do not contradict each other. They suggest a causal mechanism that explains 
why both rival theories are, in fact, simultaneously correct. This causal mechanism they 
call the 'political allegiance' perspective.  
However, the authors also argue that both the utilitarian and the identity perspectives 
suffer from ambiguity regarding the causal mechanisms underlying support for the EU. 
The utilitarian approach does not explain why exactly perceived benefits are routinely 
translated into a supportive European attitude rather than a positive attitude towards 
national or local government. In a similar way, the national identity perspective remains 
somewhat inconsistent in explaining the causal mechanisms underlying support for the 
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EU. For instance, Hooghe & Marks (2004, 2005) notice that national identities are 
capable both to boost and weaken support for European integration. To solve this 
inconsistency, they draw on a distinction between inclusive and exclusive identities, 
reasoning that persons with an exclusive national identity tend to be more sceptic towards 
integration than individuals with inclusive multiple identities.  
However, Hooghe & Marks still remain unclear as to why exclusive identity necessarily 
precludes support for the EU. De Vries and van Kersbergen propose the concept of 
‘political allegiance’, or the willingness of a national public to approve of and to support 
decisions made by the government, in return of a benefit on the behalf of the government. 
If a political regime can provide its citizens with well-being, the citizens in return offer 
their allegiance to social and political institutions. Political allegiance, therefore, is the 
mechanism that connects the rulers with the ruled. The concept of double allegiance thus 
explains support for the EU. Political allegiance towards supranational institutions 
originates out of the public's primary allegiance to the nation-state. The process of 
European integration produces a secondary allegiance among the publics, because 
national citizens understand that integration is necessary for providing security and well-
being. Subsequently, secondary allegiance does not weaken primary allegiance. Rather, 
the former depends on the latter. (De Vries & van Kersbergen 2007, 312-314.) 
4.4 Sovereignty based euroscepticism 
Debates over national identity often coalesce with those of national sovereignty (Sørensen 
2007, 113). Sovereignty issues reflect one of the main questions of political science 
evoked by European integration, namely the role and centrality of the nation-state. In the 
EU, some of the power of the state is given to supranational institutions, on the one hand, 
and to regions2, on the other. Generally speaking, the national integrity thesis portrays a 
battle between two different types of support for the European Union: the 
intergovernmental version and the supranational version. In the intergovernmentalist 
version, nation-states and national governments are the key actors pursuing their interests 
through international cooperation (cf. Moravcsik 1998), whereas supranationalism 
anticipates and embraces the gradual shift of power from the national to the supranational 
level through the spill-over mechanism (cf. Haas 1958). Hence, in the first model, the role 
                                                 
2 As per the EU’s subsidiarity principle. 
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and the position of the nation-state are actually strengthened by the integration process, 
and the loss of sovereignty is not an issue. In contrast, if one adopts the second model of 
integration, the theory of sovereignty based euroscepticism becomes plausible.  
As the process of integration renders national sovereignty in increasing areas to 
supranational institutions, and aims to harmonise legislation and standards, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the integration process may activate public concerns about 
national integrity. National integrity refers to public perception of the indivisibility of the 
nation-state, and in terms of the EU's impact on national integrity, it is most visible 
through the pooling of national sovereignty. This approach suggests that euroscepticism 
represents reluctance to increasing competencies (in areas such as common foreign and 
defence policy, the loss of national currencies as well as the harmonisation of certain 
policy areas such as immigration) of the EU, thereby potentially weakening national 
integrity and sovereignty. In this view, euroscepticism stems from the fact that citizens 
perceive the nation-state as the appropriate point of reference in politics and the EU as 
undermining the integrity of the nation-state. It should be noted, however, that the 
sceptical attitudes do not apply to all policy areas, and what constitutes a 'sensitive' 
national issue varies across member states (Sørensen 2007, 113).  
Also, as mentioned above, sovereignty issues often coincide with national identity. In this 
way, the relationship between cultural identity and European integration operates within 
a ‘threat’ mode that equates political community and social and cultural identity with a 
territoriality bounded by national frontiers. From this viewpoint, European integration is 
an unacceptable imposition. The ultimate outcome of political integration is imagined as 
the abolition of the nation-state. (Hedetoft 1999, 14-15.) 
4.5 The democratic deficit 
The democratic deficit approach became widely popular as a means to understanding 
public euroscepticism following the problems with ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992. The point of departure is the assumption that the transfer of many and increasingly 
important government functions to the European level requires the EU to live up to certain 
democratic standards. What these standards are, however, is contested in the theoretical 
literature (for example Weiler et al. 1995, Mény 2003, Bellamy 2006). Nevertheless, the 
success of democracy in modern western societies is largely measured by the public’s 
participation in the process, the respect for human rights, and the responsiveness of the 
33 
 
system to popular demands (Dalton 2008, 2). If a political system fails to achieve these 
goals, it is said to suffer from a legitimacy or democratic deficit. 
Theoretical literature has mainly concentrated on two dimensions of the democratic 
deficit. The first one highlights the importance of the undemocratic nature of European 
institutions, whereas the other stresses socio-cultural reasons, such as the lack of a 
common European identity, or demos. Føllesdal and Hix (2006, 534-537) offer a good 
summary of the characteristics of the institutional democratic deficit. There are five 
characteristics: 
1. First, European integration has increased the power of the national executives and 
at the same time it has decreased national parliamentary control. In a democratic 
nation-state the government is indirectly accountable to the voters via the 
parliament which can hire and fire the cabinet, and can exercise parliamentary 
scrutiny over the behaviour of ministers. In the EU, however, the actions of the 
executive are beyond the control of national parliaments. As a result, governments 
can effectively ignore national parliaments while making decisions at the 
European level. The fact that, in reality, national parliaments do not have enough 
time or resources to effectively control their executives in Brussels, further 
aggravates the problem.  
2. As national parliaments have lost some of their ability to control their respective 
government officials, the power of the European Parliament could be increased to 
balance the situation. This has not been the case, however. Although its position 
has improved over the years, the European Parliament’s legislative powers are still 
far weaker compared to the Council and the European Commission. For example, 
although the EP has equal legislative power with the Council under the co-
decision procedure, most of the EU legislation is still passed under the 
consultation procedure, where the Parliament has only a limited power of say.   
3. Third, there are no real European elections. Despite the fact that EU citizens elect 
the European Parliament, the parliamentary elections are not about parties at the 
European level or the content of the EU policy agenda, but act as ‘mid-term 
national contests’ for incumbent national governments. Low turnout in European 
elections also reflects the problem. In the 2014 elections, the overall turnout was 
43 %. The European parliamentary elections have often been called ‘second-order 
elections’, where governing parties and large parties lose while opposition and 
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small parties win irrespective of these parties’ EU agenda. This lack of European 
element, both in national and European elections means that EU citizens’ 
preferences are hardly reflected in the actual EU policies. If there were a genuine 
electoral competition between parties at the European level, the outcome of the 
election would have a direct influence on what EU leaders would do. Furthermore, 
it would have an effect on the formation of the Commission, and would ensure 
EU citizens the power to ‘throw out’ undesired leaders.  
4. Fourth, the EU is too distant from its citizens. Institutionally speaking, electoral 
control over the Council and the Commission is too removed. Psychologically, 
the EU is too different from the domestic democratic institutions that citizens are 
used to, and as a result, they cannot understand the EU. The Commission is neither 
a government nor a bureaucracy, and is appointed through a complex procedure 
rather than elected directly or indirectly. The Council is part legislature, part 
executive, and when acting as legislature, most of its decisions are still made in 
secret. As for the European Parliament, it cannot be a properly deliberative 
assembly because of lack of common language and political culture. Also, the 
policy process is more technocratic than political.  
5. Fifth, governments are able to adopt such policies at the European level that they 
could not pursue at the domestic level. As a result, the EU often adopts policies 
that are not supported by the majority of the citizens in member states. This 
critique often comes from the left side of the political spectrum. As the European 
Parliament is not very strong, private interest groups do not have to compete with 
the democratic process of party politics. Also, concentrated interest groups such 
as private owners have greater incentive to organise at the European level than 
diffuse interest groups such as trade unions or consumer groups. This skews the 
EU policy outcomes more towards the interests of the owners of capital.  
 
The lack of a common European identity, a European demos, and a European public 
sphere is said to also deepen the Union’s democratic deficit (Jolly 2005, Rubavičius 
2009). Here, the question is not about the legal dimension of the term, which includes 
rights and citizenship Instead, demos here refers to the social dimension, which includes 
common history and language (Jolly 2005, 14-15), and transnational solidarity (see 
Habermas 2001, 2003, 2013). In democratic political systems, the principle of popular 
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sovereignty assumes that the only valid source of political authority lies with the people. 
This in turn raises the question of who constitutes the people, and makes issues of political 
identity crucial. (Beetham & Lord 1998, 6.) Members of a democratic political system 
must respect the decisions of the majority, and in order for this to happen, there needs to 
be a sense of shared political identity (Lord 2004, 43). In a nation-state, the shared identity 
usually stems from ethnicity and common language. However, with 28 member states, 
each with its own history, culture and language, the EU is not likely to develop a sense of 
common nation or ethnic identity. Therefore, in place of the nation, the normative 
conception of democracy could entail the idea of European citizens. In this view, 
affiliation would be based on a belief in commonly shared values and procedural rules 
instead of (national) identity (Decker 2002, 256, 263-264, Beetham & Lord 1998, 29.)  
Following similar lines of thinking, Jakonen and Korvela (2011) argue that the “no-demos 
claim” is in some respects misleading (since it is really a European ethnos that is missing, 
not demos), and democracy does not need “people” understood as a pre-political unit, but 
instead the EU could build its identity on a common future. 
Some scholars argue against the very notion of the democratic deficit, or do not perceive 
of it as significant. For Andrew Moravcsik (2002, 605-606), national governments still 
run the EU, and since the EU is not a state, it does not require the democratic standards 
of one. According to Moravcsik, the critics fail to appreciate the division of labour 
between national states and the EU, in which the EU specialises in those functions of 
modern democratic governance that simply tends to involve less direct political 
participation. Also, as EU policy-making is clean, transparent, effective and politically 
responsive to the demands of European citizens, the EU is quite democratic enough. The 
legitimacy of international institutions derives from its legality (superior jurisdiction to 
which national governments and legal systems are subordinate), on the one hand, and its 
level of legitimation (public recognition and affirmation by the established legitimate 
authorities), on the other hand (Beetham & Lord 1998, 11).  
Giandomenico Majone (1998, 5-28) sees the EU as an agency whose main function is 
economic, social and legal regulation, and that in a modern political system such 
regulation is best undertaken by independent bodies staffed by the relevant experts. 
Therefore, policy-making of the EU does not need to be democratic in the usual meaning 
of the term. Furthermore, the undemocratic nature of EU institutions does not create a 
legitimacy issue, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and 
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narrowly defined. Taking decisions according to a partisan and majoritarian logic in the 
EU would constitute a negative development, as integration should be protected from its 
consensus seeking political mechanisms, which hinder the reaching of the most efficient 
and optimal solutions. 
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5 Analysis 
In this section I will introduce the data and methods used in the thesis. Furthermore, I will 
present the objects of support as well as the variables through which the objects of support 
are assumed to manifest in the chosen data set.   
5.1 Presenting data 
Public opinion will be analysed through quantitative measures in this thesis, using the 
Eurobarometer polls. Although polling in this perspective is rather simple, one must bear 
in mind that opinions expressed by citizens in a survey are not always honest. Therefore 
researchers need to understand and separate public opinions from private ones. One could 
also consider public opinion as an equivalent of social norms. In this view, the values and 
beliefs of the majority of citizens are the true basis of public opinion, and therefore the 
only relevant public opinion that really matters is what most citizens think. Here is the 
risk, however, of ‘tyranny of the majority’, where the minority’s views might be left 
unarticulated or ignored. (Glynn et al. 1999, 17-19.) Furthermore, it should be 
acknowledged that not everything about public opinion is found in statistics and 
percentages of public opinion surveys. However, the value of the empirical method is that 
it provides a specific reference standard against which we can measure contrasting 
descriptions of public opinion. (Dalton 2008, 3.) 
The data used in this thesis is the European Commission's Standard Eurobarometer poll 
from November 2013 (EB 80.1). Eurobarometer polls are a series of surveys conducted 
biannually (spring and autumn) by the Directorate-General Press and Communication 
(COMM) of the European Commission since 1973. The polls have included Greece since 
autumn 1980, Portugal and Spain since autumn 1985, the former German Democratic 
Republic since autumn 1990, and Austria, Finland and Sweden from spring 1995 
onwards. In 2001, the European Commission also began to conduct EC-EB surveys in 
the (then) 13 candidate countries, namely Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
applicant country Turkey. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the previous candidate 
countries have been included in the Eurobarometer surveys. Croatia was included after 
its membership in July 2013. An identical set of questions is asked of representative 
samples of the population aged fifteen years and over in each member state. The polls 
carried out in Finland exclude the Åland Islands.  
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Eurobarometer polls are conducted between two and five times per year, and reports are 
published biannually. The regular sample in Standard Eurobarometer polls is 1000, with 
a few exceptions (Germany 1500, Luxembourg 600, and the United Kingdom 1300, 
including 300 in Northern Ireland). The sampling design is a multi-stage, random 
(probability) one. The sampling is based on a random selection of sampling points after 
stratification by the distribution of the national, resident population in terms of 
metropolitan, urban and rural areas, i.e. proportional to the population size (for a total 
coverage of the country) and to the population density. Primary sampling units (PSU) are 
selected from each of the administrative regions in every country, and addresses are 
chosen systematically using standard random route procedures, beginning with an initial 
address selected at random. Furthermore, in each household, a respondent is selected by 
a random procedure, such as the first birthday method. Up to two recalls are made to 
obtain an interview with the selected respondent. No more than one interview is 
conducted in each household, and interviews are conducted face-to-face in respondents' 
homes and in the appropriate national language. In Finland, the questionnaire is in Finnish 
as well as in Swedish.3  
There are four main types of Eurobarometer surveys. The Standard Eurobarometer poll 
typically covers over 40 questions with a commentary and cover longer-term trend 
questions. Special Eurobarometer polls have since the early 1970's surveyed public 
opinion towards specific issues, such as enlargements, the Economic and Monetary 
Union, and globalisation. Flash Eurobarometer surveys are ad hoc polls aimed at 
providing almost instantaneous information of topical issues, such as the common market 
or the common currency, sometimes from specific target groups. Finally, the 
Eurobarometer has started to conduct qualitative studies to provide in-depth data on the 
motivations, feelings and reactions of specific social groups towards a given subject or 
concept. Over time, the number of questions posed in the Standard Eurobarometer polls 
has increased. Moreover, some questions are asked in every poll, while others are asked 
randomly or only once. Some questions have been dropped altogether and others added 
in an attempt to reflect the evolution of the construction of the Union, as well as the 
official concerns and/or interests in Brussels at a given time.4 
                                                 
3 http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series, 1.10.2014 
4 NIRA Research Output 2002 Vol. 15(1), see: http://nira.or.jp/past/publ/routp/pdf/v15n01.pdf 
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Generally speaking, there are shortcomings in all quantitative data concerning the 
formulation of questions and the offered options for multiple choice questions, the 
interpretation of questions and the usage of results.  A certain way of formulating the 
question might entice a certain answer by either not presenting all possible options (of 
questions or answers), or by posing the same question in different forms. The wording of 
the questions should also be simple enough to avoid interpretation by the respondent, thus 
to ensure that the respondents give their answer to the question posed. Moreover, in cross-
border opinion polls such as the Eurobarometer, the possibility of interpretation grows as 
questions are translated into various languages. One must also bear in mind that there are 
many possible ways of reading the results of any opinion poll, and that there are often 
certain interests behind the presentation of the results (Bourdieu 1972, 1-4).  
Ideally, a researcher would use data specifically designed to study the object of the 
research. However, in the absence of the necessary resources, this thesis needs to rely on 
Eurobarometer data, and thus also accept its obvious shortcomings. Firstly, the data 
quality could be improved on substantive as well as methodological grounds. For 
instance, the formulation of questions is rarely one-dimensional, and thus questions do 
not necessarily measure what they are supposed to measure (Schmitt 2003, 248). There 
is also room for improvement in the variety of the questions asked, and the questions 
could focus more on the possible reasons behind attitudes, to enable a more in-depth 
analysis of public opinion(s). Furthermore, the questions and/or wording of the questions 
often vary between polls, making longitudinal analyses more difficult. 
There is also scope for methodological improvement: Pure probability sampling (as 
opposed to Eurobarometer's multi-stage random sampling design) as well as larger 
samples and more efforts to secure higher interview completion rates would result in 
better data quality and higher representativeness. Moreover, the risk of bias resulting from 
the fact that the Eurobarometer surveys are sponsored by the European Commission is 
worth mentioning, as Eurobarometer polls also serve a short-term political purpose as 
well as the long-term analytical one. (Schmitt 2003, 248.)  
Missing data also poses a problem in most survey designs. A person's failure to respond 
to some of the questions may result in much wasted information, as many software 
programs that are  used to analyse the data-sets ignore cases for which observations are 
missing for at least one of the variables used. For example, listwise and pairwise deletion 
of missing cases are the options for handling missing cases for R plugin for SPSS. 
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Listwise deletion eliminates all cases with any amount of missing data from a calculation, 
thus sacrificing a large amount of data, which in turn decreases power of explanation and 
may introduce bias in parameter estimation (Roth 1994, 539). Listwise deletion can also 
affect the representativeness of large n polls, if it could be found that it is members of a 
certain socio-demographic group who consistently fail to respond to a certain poll 
question. (Sørensen 2007, 152-154). Pairwise deletion, on the other hand, deletes 
information only from those statistics that “need” the information. Thus it preserves more 
information, but it can also cause problematic results, as different parts of the sample are 
used for each statistic. This might lead to mathematically inconsistent correlations, for 
example. (Roth 1994, 540.) The data in this thesis represents 1009 respondents of Finnish 
nationality, out of which listwise deletion would remove 283, i.e. nearly 30 % of the 
respondents. Because of this significant data loss, this thesis uses pairwise deletion where 
applicable. 
The dependent variables used are either ordinal Likert-type (“In general, does the EU 
conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative 
image?”) or dichotomous (“For each of the following, please let me know whether you 
tend to trust or tend not to trust it”). Cronbach’s alpha remains the most widely and 
frequently used reliability index, which, however, is a non-ordinal coefficient. Therefore 
it is not suitable for this thesis, as it might lead to substantively deflated reliability 
estimates. Instead, I will use ordinal alpha, which has shown to estimate reliability more 
accurately than Cronbach’s alpha for binary and ordinal response scales. (Gadermann et 
al. 2012, 1-2.) The ordinal alpha is calculated using the R environment.  
5.2 Presenting methods 
I have included 18 variables for the exploratory factor analysis to measure the different 
facets of attitudes towards the European Union at different levels. These variables can be 
found in table 5. DK (“don’t know”) answers were recoded as missing, no other recoding 
was done. Cases were selected using filter variable “Nationality: FINLAND”. No 
significant outliers were found. The purpose was to find out whether the four objects of 
support in Norris’ model manifest, and to assess how much of Finnish popular 
euroscepticism the four objects of support account for. Originally, 30 variables were 
chosen for the model, but some items were removed due to low communality or low 
response rate, and some were removed as a result of reliability analysis. All the original 
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variables are listed in Appendix 1. The aim was to keep only valid and reliable data with 
as much as explanation power as possible. I have also included 38 independent and 
control variables into the model to be used as antecedents in order to assess the relative 
contribution of each object of support (cf. Boomgaarden et al. 2011). These variables are 
listed in Table 15. 
 
Table 5: Variables used in exploratory factor analysis 
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I have employed IBM SPSS Statistics (version 19) to conduct an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA), followed by several multiple linear regression analyses. However, as the 
data items in this thesis are either ordinal Likert-type variables, or nominal dichotomous 
variables, using IBM SPSS alone does not suffice to carry out all the needed analyses. I 
have therefore also used R - which is a free programming language and an environment 
for statistical computing - as well as an R plugin for SPSS, which allow me to handle 
ordinal and nominal data more appropriately, for reasons that are more thoroughly 
explained in the following paragraphs.  
A factor analysis is based on correlations between measured variables, and therefore 
correlation or covariance matrix for the variables need to be computed. In SPSS, the only 
correlation matrix available to perform exploratory factor analysis is the Pearson 
correlation, and internal reliability is mainly measured with Cronbach’s alpha. (Basto & 
Pereira 2012, 4.) However, Pearson correlations assume that data have been measured on, 
at least, on equal interval scale and a linear relationship exists between the variables 
(Baglin 2014, 2). These assumptions are typically not true with ordinal data. Therefore, 
applying traditional factor analysis procedures to item-level data almost always produces 
misleading and unmeaningful results. Factor analysis using Pearson’s correlations when 
dealing with Likert-type data may produce factors, for example, that are based solely on 
item distribution similarity. Moreover, the items may appear multidimensional when in 
fact they are not. (Basto & Pereira 2012, 4.) An ordinal variable can be thought of as a 
crude representation of an unobserved continuous variable. The estimates of the 
correlations between these unobserved variables are called polychoric correlations, which 
are used when both variables are dichotomous or ordinal, but both are also assumed to 
reflect underlying continuous variables. Polychoric correlations extrapolate what the 
categorical variables distributions would be if they were continuous, adding tails to the 
distribution. (Ibid., 4.)  
Factor analysis is concerned with identifying the underlying factor structure that explains 
relationships between the observed variables. EFA in particular aims to explore the 
dimensionality of a scale proposing to measure a latent variable (Baglin 2014, 2). As with 
any factor analysis, deciding the correct number of factors in EFA is crucial. Extracting 
too few factors (under extraction) can overlook potentially relevant factors, resulting in a 
loss of relevant information. Over extraction, on the other hand, increases results with 
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noise, might produce factors with few high loadings, and potentially give too much 
substantive importance to trivial factors. (Basto & Pereira 2012, 5.)  Under extraction is 
generally considered to be more detrimental than over extraction (Schmitt 2011, 308).  
The most used procedures for determining the number of factors are the Kaiser criterion 
and the scree test. In the Kaiser criterion all factors with eigenvalue greater than one are 
retained. In the scree test, which is a graphical representation of the eigenvalues, all 
factors prior to the bend (or elbow) of the curve are retained. Less known procedures are 
the parallel analysis (PA) and Velicer’s minimum average partial (Velicer’s MAP) criteria. 
PA retains the factors that account for more variance than the factors derived from 
generated random data. With Velicer’s MAP criteria, factors are retained as long as the 
variance in the correlation matrix represents systematic variance. The number of factors 
is determined by the step number k, where k varies from zero to the number of variables 
minus one. The Velicer’s MAP criteria has a tendency to underestimate the number of 
factors when there are few variables loading in a particular factor or when there are low 
variable loadings. (Basto & Pereira 2012, 5-6.) 
The residual matrix assesses the quality of the factorial model. A high percentage of 
residuals less than 0,05 is considered as an indicator of good adjustment. There are also 
several goodness-of-fit statistics, out of which goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the root 
mean square residual (RMSR) are available in the R plugin for SPSS. In general, values 
above 0,90 for GFI indicate a good fit and above 0,95 indicate a very good fit. (Ibid., 7.) 
The RMSR employs the residual matrix, and values less than 0,08 are regarded as 
acceptable fit (Schmitt 2011, 310). 
5.3 Selection of variables 
As already argued, the EU meets all the necessary requirements of a political system, and 
support towards it can therefore be analysed through David Easton’s theoretical 
framework of diffuse and specific support. We will now turn to Easton’s model, which 
has been further elaborated by Norris (1999, 2011). 
For Easton, a political system can be defined as a complex set of interactions through 
which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a society. A political system is a 
means of resolving differences, or a set of interactions through which (public) demands, 
or inputs, are processed into outputs. From another perspective, it is a means through 
which the resources of the society (people) are mobilized and oriented to the pursuit of 
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goals. In this sense, the support of members of the society is needed if a system is to 
function. Support, for Easton, is important because it is the way a political system can be 
maintained even when the public demonstrates dissatisfaction towards the system. 
(Easton 1965b, 153-154.) Where citizens support the system, they accept the legitimacy 
of the political system to govern within its territorial boundaries. They do not challenge 
the basic constitutional structure and rules of the game or the authority of the 
officeholders. Systems support is therefore understood as a psychological orientation. 
(Norris 2011, 20.) 
Easton distinguishes between two forms of political support. Specific support is directed 
towards the system’s institutions and authorities and is based on the direct or expected 
benefits gained by individuals Support may grow due to material rewards, such as 
economic growth, better employment or educational opportunities. Diffuse support, on 
the other hand, represents the support towards the political system and its values in 
general. Diffuse support forms a reservoir of good will towards the community that helps 
members to accept or tolerate outcomes to which they are opposed, and is therefore 
independent of the effects of daily outputs. (Easton 1965b, 267-273). 
Indicators of specific support include the popularity of incumbent authorities, as well as 
support for particular political parties. It also covers attitudes towards government civil 
servants, such as the military or the police. Specific support for incumbent officeholders 
is expected to fluctuate over time in response to short-term contextual factors, such as 
administration performance, major shifts in public policy, or changes in party leadership. 
Thus, specific support toward officeholders should be explicable by short- or medium-
term factors, such as the government’s management of economic, social or foreign policy, 
fluctuations in the economic market, or the impact of global events and international 
affairs. A persistent lack of specific support does not therefore undermine the legitimacy 
of the political system or erode the fundamental authority of its agencies and actors. By 
contrast, diffuse political support represents more abstract feelings towards the political 
system and its agencies. Generalised support toward the community and regime helps 
citizens to accept the legitimacy of the political system, its agencies and officeholders, 
even when people are highly critical of specific policies, particular political processes, or 
specific leaders. Therefore, generalized attachment toward the community is expected to 
prove more stable and enduring. Diffuse support is exemplified by feelings of national 
pride and identity, as well as by adherence to core regime values and principles. It is also 
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important to note here that the conceptual distinction between specific and diffuse support 
should be understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomous typology. (Norris 2011, 
21-22.) 
Easton also distinguishes between three objects of support, namely the political 
community, the political regime, and the authorities. Political community refers to a group 
of persons who participate in a common structure and set of processes. It does not matter 
whether the members form a community in the sociological sense of a group of members 
who have a sense of community or a set of common traditions. The members of a political 
system may well have different cultures and traditions or they may be of separate 
nationalities, and cooperation need not lead to strengthening the sentiments of mutual 
identification. It suffices that the group shares an attachment towards the general values 
of the political system. (Easton 1965b, 177.) 
The regime refers to the constitutional order of the political system. The need for the 
regime stems from the fact that members need to accept some basic procedures and rules 
relating to the means through which controversy over demands is to be regulated and 
outcomes distributed. In other words, the regime entails the a) values, b) norms and c) the 
structure of authority, i.e. formal and informal organization and distribution of power. The 
structure of authority determines how political decisions are made, how those decisions 
are complied with, and how they should be implemented within the system. Norms define 
and specify the ground rules (customary or legal) for overall political participation, and it 
is the underlying values that help to shape the content of the operating norms and the 
structure of authority. (Easton 1965b, 190-205.) Just like the political community, the 
political regime often benefits from a reservoir of diffuse support that has been built up 
over a number of years. This also makes possible for the political system to tolerate 
recurring dissatisfaction towards its political authorities. (Berglund et al. 2006, 60.)  
The authorities form the third object of support. Authorities are government officials and 
politicians ranging from the highest to the lowest level, such as the executives, legislators, 
judges and administrators. Authorities need to conform to a certain criteria: They must 
engage in the daily affairs of the political system; they must be recognised by most 
members of the system as having responsibility for these matters; and their actions must 
be accepted as binding most of the time by most of the members (Easton 1965b, 212.)  
Pippa Norris (1999, 2011) has further elaborated Easton’s original model. While the 
concepts of political community and authorities are carried over into the new typology 
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virtually unchanged, the regime includes three new categories – regime principles, regime 
performance and regime institutions. While Easton’s concept of regime does entail the 
values, norms and the structure of authority, it does not permit members of the system to 
pick and choose between different elements of the regime, approving some parts while 
rejecting others.  Yet, in real life, citizens seem to distinguish between different levels of 
the regime as well as different institutions. The new typology therefore includes political 
support for the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime 
institutions, and political actors. (Norris 1999, 9. Norris 2011, 24-25.)  
 
 
Table 6: Objects of support and their basic characteristics (based on Norris 1999). 
 
My analysis of public euroscepticism as it manifests in Finland will make use of the 
fivefold typology offered by Norris et al. with the exception of political actors. As the 
visibility of European political leaders can be deemed weak for an ordinary citizen, this 
category of specific support will be left out from the scope of this thesis. The other four 
objects of support will be discussed in the following chapters. Also, the context of Norris’ 
typology is a nation-state, whereas the context of this thesis is the European Union. 
Therefore, the characteristics of support on each level differ somewhat from the original 
typology. 
5.3.1 The political community 
The political community is essentially formed by a group of people who are “drawn 
together” through participation in a common structure and set of processes, however tight 
or loose the ties may be. The members of a political system may have different cultures 
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and traditions and they may even be different nationalities. As long as the members share 
an attachment to the overall group through which demands in a system are processed, 
they will be supporting the existence of the community. (Easton 1965b, 177-178.) In 
short, the support for the political community only necessitates a sense of belonging to 
the community (i.e. a sense of citizenship).  
The political community represents the most fundamental level of support (Berglund et 
al. 2006, 60), and it is also the dimension of support which fluctuates the least. Authorities 
are often quite frequently replaced, performance of the regime varies across time, and 
even constitutional arrangements can change, but the political community typically 
remains quite stable (Easton 1965b, 179). The political community benefits from a 
reserve of diffuse support that has been built up over a number of years (Berglund et al. 
2006, 60), and in times of crisis, democractic political regimes draw legitimacy from 
diffuse support from its citizens (Ringlerova 2014, 1). On the other hand, the loss of 
support for the political community can cripple the political system altogether (Easton 
1965b, 189). 
In the context of a nation-state, support for the community represents sense of belonging 
expressed through feelings of patriotism, national pride, and a sense of national identity 
(Norris 2011, 25), and attachment to the political community is conventionally measured 
by items tapping a sense of belonging to the community, national pride, and national 
identity. (Norris 1999, 10-11.) However, the support for the EU as a political community 
can be expressed through general trust (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014) in and an attachment 
(Berglund et al. 2006) to the EU, a sense of citizenship and a willingness to participate in 
the political processes of the EU, which also includes concerns about the possible future 
of the European Union. 
5.3.2 Regime principles 
Regime principles represent the values of the political system (Norris 1999, 11), and 
support for the regime principles represents adherence to the principles and normative 
values upon which the regime is founded, reflecting beliefs about the legitimacy of the 
constitutional arrangements and the formal and informal rules of the game (ibid., 26). 
Establishing and identifying common values is somewhat troublesome, as not all 
members of a political system can be expected to define or support the identical set of 
political values, at least without defining values on a very high level (Easton 1965b, 196-
197). However, in contemporary western states, the ideals of democracy tend to be most 
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prominently valued. Although the concept of democracy remains highly contested (see 
for example Setälä 2003 for a deeper analysis), and, consequently, as democracy means 
different things to different people at different times and different societies, there is no 
consensus as to which values should be nominated as most important. (Norris 1999, 11.)  
It can be argued, however, that democratic principles entail at least citizens’ consent to 
their rulers, public officials’ accountability to those they govern, support for the 
underlying values of freedom, opportunity in participation in decision making, equality 
of rights and tolerance of minorities, respect for human rights, and the rule of law (Norris 
2011, 27). On a more general level, it can be a question of democracy as the best form of 
government. There is a question in the 80.1 Eurobarometer survey which measures 
satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union. However, due to the 
wording of the question the item is expected to reflect regime performance rather than 
regime principles. The image of the European Union has also been used as an indicator 
of general support towards the EU (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014), but in this study it is 
assumed to reflect regime principles (Berglund et al. 2006).  
There are three other items which are expected to reflect regime principles, since they are 
related either to democratic political participation (“My voice counts in the EU”), or to 
the desired method of integration (“The EU should develop into a federation of nation 
states” and “The interests of our country are well taken into account in the EU”). The 
usage of the two latter items can be justified with two different theories of integration, 
and they are expected to measure two different sides of the same topic. The objective of 
the European political process has been – and still is - contested within the integration 
theory literature, and there is no consensus on the desired permanent political structures 
or the level of federalism that these structures should attain. The reason is obviously the 
ambivalent nature of the process itself and the resulting sui generis characteristic of the 
European Union. (Tiilikainen & Palosaari 2007, 9-11.) Thus, theories of integration have 
also become theories on the formation of the EU as a political system as well as the 
principles of that political system. The underlying theory of integration is federalist in the 
question “the EU should develop into a federation of nation states” item (see for example 
Burgess 2009, Kelemen & Nicolaidis 2006, Raunio 2002b), whereas the question “the 
interests of our country are well taken into account in the EU” draws from liberal 
intergovernmentalism (for example Cini 2010, Moravcsik 1998, Moravcsik 2002). 
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5.3.3 Regime performance 
Support for regime performance is utilitarian in nature as it assesses how the regime 
functions in practice overall. It can be broadly a question of having benefited from 
membership (Berglund et al. 2006). However, it can also refer to satisfaction with the 
general democratic performance (Norris 2011), or with specific policy areas, such as 
economic performance (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996, 
Gabel & Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, McLaren 2004, Survillo et al. 2010). National 
identity may also play a role in (dis)satisfaction towards performance (Carey, 2002, 
Luedtke 2005, Bruter 2008, Van Klingeren et al. 2013). Moreover, regime performance 
can entail support (or the lack thereof) for the shifting of competence from member states 
to the European Union in general, or the shifting of competence of some policy areas in 
particular (Gabel & Anderson 2002, Lubbers & Scheepers 2005, Boomgaarden et al. 
2011). 
Although being a very multifaceted phenomenon, or perhaps because of it, the support 
for regime performance taps a ‘middle level’ of support which can often be difficult to 
gauge (Norris 1999, 2011). Many studies utilize satisfaction with the way democracy 
works in the European Union, and this study makes no exception. Despite opposite views 
(see Canache et al. 2001), it is assumed that satisfaction with the way democracy works 
in the European Union taps with regime performance. Satisfaction with democracy may 
reflect both approval of democracy as an abstract principle as well as positive evaluations 
of how democratic states perform in practice (Norris 2011, 22), and it is in this latter sense 
that this thesis studies the satisfaction with democracy item. However, since the 
phenomenon is expected to be multifaceted, this thesis also applies items that tap on the 
shifting of responsibility from national level to the European level (Boomgaarden et al. 
2011). The items are as follows: 
“Thinking about reform global financial markets, please tell me whether you are in favour 
or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU.” 
1. Tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax havens 
2. The introduction of a tax on profits made by banks 
3. The introduction of a tax on financial transactions 
4. Tighter rules for credit rating agencies 
5. The regulation of wages in the financial sector (i.e. traders’ bonuses) 
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This thesis also acknowledges that the above mentioned five items give a unilateral view 
of regime performance. However, the available data unfortunately give no other 
alternative. 
5.3.4 Regime institutions 
This level of support is related to trust and confidence in the core institutions of the 
political system (Norris 2011, 29), which include governments, parliaments, the 
executive, the legal system and police, the bureaucracy, political parties, and the military. 
The aim is to measure generalized support for the institution rather than the incumbent 
office holder, or support for political parties instead of particular party leaders. (Norris 
1999, 11.)  
Trust in political institutions is considered to be one of the key elements of the functioning 
of western contemporary representative democracies. Those countries with largely 
supported institutional arrangements enjoy higher degrees of legitimacy and policy 
efficacy (Easton 1965b, 293, Arnold et al. 2012, 3). It is often also pointed out that EU 
institutions are not accountable to EU citizens, which in turn decreases support towards 
them (Rohrschneider 2002, 467). This thesis uses items which measure the trust on three 
central EU institutions, namely the European Parliament, the European Commission and 
the European Central Bank (Roth 2009, Roth et al. 2011, Arnold et al. 2012). Below is a 
summary of all the levels of support as well as their characteristics. 
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Table 7: Objects of support and their basic characteristics: nation-state vs. European Union.  
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6 Results 
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted utilizing a promax rotation and 
pairwise exclusion of cases. Statistical methods were used to determine the number of 
factors to be retained. Parallel analysis, Kaiser Rule and scree plot all suggested four 
factors. Velicer’s MAP suggested three factors, but this criterion has a tendency to 
underestimate the number of factors when there are few variables loading in a particular 
factor or when there are low variable loadings (Basto & Pereira 2012, 5-6). Also, although 
the Kaiser Criterion and the scree plot have been shown to overestimate the number of 
dimensions in the data, parallel analysis has been found to be a more effective method for 
determining the number of factors (Baglin 2014, 4). As these three methods point to the 
same outcome, I decided to retain four factors for the analysis. The details can be found 
in Appendix 2. 
Number of components/factors to retain according to different rules 
Optimal coordinates Parallel analysis Kaiser rule 
4 4 4 
Table 8: Number of factors to retain. 
 
Graph 1: Scree plot. 
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Oblique (promax) rotation was chosen since it is assumed that there is at least some 
amount of intercorrelation between the factors (see for example Costello & Osborne 2005, 
3). The reliability of the chosen variables was tested with ordinal alpha using R. The 
overall alpha is 0.82, which can be deemed as an acceptable value (Field 2009, 675). 
Reliability analysis: alpha(x = Corr2013$rho) 
raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r 
0.82 0.82 0.9 0.21 
Table 9: Data reliability analysis. 
Statistical tests were run also to assess the quality of the factorial model. Goodness-of-fit 
index (GFI) value is .924, which indicates a good fit, and the root mean square residual 
(RMSR) is .062, which is a good value (Basto & Pereira 2012, 7). The percentage of 
residuals >.005 is 39 %, which is adequate. 
Fit of the model to the correlation matrix 
 Residual fit values 
Residuals > 0,05 % residuals > 0,05 
Values 60 39,216 
Table 10: Fit of the exploratory factor analysis model. 
The sorted pattern matrix presents four distinct factors, which in total account for 63 % 
of the total variance.  
 
Variance Explained (extracted) 
 Sums of Squared 
Loadings % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6,088 33,825 33,825 
2 2,715 15,082 48,906 
3 1,420 7,888 56,794 
4 1,181 6,562 63,356 
Table 11: Variance explained by the exploratory factor analysis. 
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Sorted pattern matrix 
 
Table 12: Results of the exploratory factor analysis. 
There are four to five items loading for each factor and all loadings are positive. Item 
loadings range from ,361 to 1,065, and the average loadings for each factor are ,859 (F1), 
,714 (F2), ,594 (F3) and ,665 (F4). Communalities are between ,468 and ,919. 
Variable Name F1 F2 F3 F4
Trust in European Central Bank 1,065 -,071 -,315 -,039
Trust in European Parliament 1,035 -,074 -,094 -,031
Trust in European Comission 1,032 -,017 -,080 -,054
Trust in the European Union ,668 -,041 ,195 ,091
Satisfaction with democracy in the EU ,494 -,017 ,383 -,054
Measures taken by the EU - tax on financial 
transactions
-,125 ,769 ,260 -,238
Measures taken by the EU - regulation of wages in 
the financial sector
,023 ,723 -,289 ,055
Measures taken by the EU - tax on bank profits -,178 ,710 ,051 ,038
Measures taken by the EU - tighter rules for credit 
rating agencies
-,101 ,709 -,068 ,078
Measures taken by the EU - tougher tax rules ,196 ,659 -,630 ,068
The EU should develop into a federation of nation 
states
-,298 -,139 ,921 -,147
Image of EU ,165 -,009 ,547 ,129
Country interests taken into account in the EU ,242 ,182 ,458 ,084
My voice counts in the EU ,312 ,279 ,450 -,066
Sense of Citizenship ,049 -,011 -,198 ,873
Meaning of EU: Loss of cultural identity -,210 ,002 -,088 ,805
Attachment to EU -,017 -,068 ,310 ,620
Feeling towards future of EU ,234 -,003 ,351 ,361
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Table 13: Communalities for the exploratory factor analysis. 
Items expressing trust in the European Union in general, and in central EU institutions in 
particular, as well as satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union 
form the strongest factor, which is labelled here as ‘trust in institutions and procedures of 
the EU’ (F1). The second factor consists of items relating to economic regulation 
measures taken by the EU, which also implicate the shifting of responsibilities of a policy 
area which traditionally is handled by member states. This factor is labelled as ‘economic 
regime performance’ (F2). The third factor consists of a more varied array of items. There 
are two items that reflect the desired method of integration (‘the EU should develop into 
a federation of nation states’ and ‘the interests of our country are well taken into account 
in the EU’), one item which relates to general political participation (‘my voice counts in 
the EU’), and one item which reflects a more generalized view of the European Union 
(image of the EU). As the different theories of integration as well as political participation 
can be seen as reflecting the inherent values of the European Union, this factor is labelled 
as ‘regime principles’ (F3). As the regime principles of the EU are still widely contested, 
it seems only appropriate that the items loading on this factor show a certain multitude of 
dimensions too. Finally, items depicting a sense of belonging and attachment to the 
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European Union form the fourth and final factor, which is labelled here as ‘attachment to 
the EU as a political community’ (F4). 
Overall we can see the different objects of support (political community, regime 
principles, regime performance and regime institutions) emerging from the factor 
analysis. However, to the contrary of what was expected, the item measuring general trust 
towards the European Union did not load strongly on the ‘political community’ factor, 
but rather on ‘regime institutions’ factor. Also, it was expected that satisfaction with EU 
democracy would load strongly on ‘regime performance’ factor. Instead, it also loads 
strongly on the ‘regime institutions’ factor.  
Next, I created factor scores in order to perform further analyses of the results. Factor 
scores are created to represent each respondent’s placement on the identified factors 
(diStefano et al. 2009, 1). Unfortunately, the R plugin for SPSS does not allow using more 
refined methods of creating the scores, such as regression, Bartlett or Anderson-Rubin. 
Instead, the only options are to choose either total scores or average scores, out of which 
I chose average scores to retain the scale metric and to foster comparisons across factors, 
since there are a differing number of items per factor (ibid., 2). One downside of sum 
scores is that items with relatively low loading values are given the same weight in the 
factor score as items with higher loading values, which might result in less reliable factor 
scores.  
Factor scores were then normalized for two reasons. First, as the score variables are on 
different scales, normalization enables the comparison of factors and allows for an easier 
interpretation. Second, it permits observing the variation in the data on a standardized 
scale. The scores were normalized using the following formula: 
 
normalized variable = (factor name – mean) / standard deviation 
 
The below histograms show the results of the normalization. They also reveal the overall 
positivity or negativity of each factor. Generally speaking, the respondents seem to hold 
rather positive views on the European Union. Trust in institutions and procedres (graph 
2) incorporates perhaps the most negative overall attitudes, whereas the other three factors 
are positive, as well as centred. The histograms therefore paint a quite positive picture of 
Finnish euroscepticism.  
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         Graph 4: Regime principles.               Graph 5: Attachment to EU as a political community. 
 
In order to find out the objects of Finnish euroscepticism as well as possible indicators 
leading to sceptic attitudes, simple scatterplots of the factors and each item loading on the 
factor were first created to determine the position of each respondent on the EU negative 
– EU positive dimension of the factors. The scatterplots can be found in Appendices 3-6. 
The results show that the more negative the value, the more positive the actual response 
has been. 
Four linear multiple regression analyses were then conducted in order to determine the 
effect of certain independent variables to each of the objects of support. There were quite 
many independent variables introduced to the model. National proxies were measured 
with an index variable of trust in central national institutions (McLaren 2005, Arnold et 
al. 2012, Harteveld et al. 2013, Armingeon & Ceka, 2014) and satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in country (Anderson 1998, McLaren 2004, Rohrschneider 2002, 
Arnold et al. 2012). Knowledge about the EU was measured by an index variable of 
having heard of central EU institutions (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014) and knowing 
citizen rights. Economic considerations were measured on three levels: personal, national 
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and European. Personal job situation (McLaren 2004) and financial household situation 
(Anderson 1998), national economic (Anderson 1998) and national employment 
situation, and European economic situation were all included. Support for central EU 
policies was measured with attitudes towards the single currency, common defence 
policy, common foreign policy, future enlargement and European political parties. Items 
measuring understanding EU as a political system (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014), 
considerations on the future of the EU, perceptions on the economic crisis and attitudes 
towards globalisation were also included into the model. Furthermore, the analysis 
controlled for gender (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, McLaren 2005), current occupation 
(Gabel 1998a, McLaren 2004), size and type of community, education (McLaren 2004, 
Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014, Arnold et al. 2012, Hakhverdian et al. 2013), age (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2004, McLaren 2005), self-assessment of social class, language of interview as 
well as European exposure, measured through international openness index (available in 
the 80.1 Eurobarometer data) and having benefited from living in another EU member 
state. Recoding was done as necessary, for example for creating the necessary dummy 
variables. Independence of observations (i.e. lack of autocorrelation) was tested with 
Durbin-Watson statistic. Multicollinearity was not observed. No significant outliers were 
found.  
 
Table 14: Regression analyses model summary. 
 
I also created scatterplot graphs with regression line for each factor and the significant 
independent variables to visualise the eurosceptic attitudes of the respondents. These 
scatterplots can be found in Appendices 7-10, and the response values are listed in 
Appendix 11, but the main results will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
The independent variables account for about 54 % of the variance in the first factor (trust 
in institutions and procedures). Two of the most influential independent variables are the 
index variable of trust in national institutions (B=0,601) and satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in country (B=0,549). For both items, the more a person trusts national 
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institutions or is satisfied with Finnish democracy, the more she also tends to support EU 
institutions and procedures. Better future outside the EU offers similar tendency of 
responses: if a person feels future would be better outside the European Union, she is also 
more inclined to show sceptic attitude towards this factor. Positive considerations of the 
future of the EU also show a similar pattern. If a person agrees with this question, she is 
more likely to show support for European institutions. European economic situation is 
also quite a strong predictor of this factor (B=0,220). If a respondent deems European 
economic situation as bad, she is prone to be less supportive of EU institutions. Sense of 
citizenship, support for single currency and urban type of community are less powerful 
predictors of support, but are nevertheless statistically significant. In summary, people 
who tend not to trust national institutions and are not satisfied with the way democracy 
works in Finland, who have a pessimistic outlook on European economy as well as the 
future of the European Union, or who tend to identify themselves as Finnish only, are 
showing lack of support towards EU institutions and democracy and can thus be called 
as eurosceptic on this dimension. 
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Table 15: Multiple linear regression analyses summary. 
 
The economic regime performance factor mainly measures the shifting of responsibilities 
from national level to European level. Moreover, it only covers taxation and other type of 
economic regulation that the EU might take up on. The investigated indicators only 
account for about 18 % of the phenomenon of economic regime performance. This is not 
surprising, however, given the fact that the factor itself is rather unidimensional.  
Nevertheless, knowing citizen rights is the most powerful predictor of this factor 
(B=0,290). If a person tends to know her rights as EU citizen she shows less sceptic 
attitudes of economic regime performance. Understanding how the EU works is also a 
predictor of this factor. Those who claim to understand the working of the EU tend to be 
more supportive. Age seems to have a slight impact on this factor. Rather surprisingly, it 
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seems that the older a person is, the more supportive she tends to be of the economic 
performance of the EU. However, the age distribution of the respondents is somewhat 
skewed, and almost 47 % of the respondents are 60 or older. Also curiously enough, those 
who are against further enlargement and common defense policy seem to be more 
supportive of economic regime performance. In a similar fashion, those who feel that only 
country can cope with the negative effects of globalization tend to show more sceptic 
views on economic regime performance. In contrast, if a person agrees that EU will be 
stronger as a result of the economic crisis, she also tends to be more supportive of this 
factor.  
There are as many as 20 statistically significant variables that contribute to the about 52 
% variance of the third factor (regime principles). Opinions about central EU policies 
(single currency, future enlargement and common foreign policy) seem to have quite a 
big effect on the attitudes towards regime principles. The direction of correlation is also 
the same for all variables: if a person tends to support these policies, she also tends to be 
more supportive of EU’s regime principles. The degree of certain openness and exposure 
to internationalization as well as understanding and knowing the EU are also rather strong 
predictors of attitudes towards the regime principles. Low degree of openness and 
exposure on the one hand, and not knowing or understanding the EU, on the other, seem 
to produce more sceptical attitudes towards the EU’s regime principles. National proxies 
form the third group of predictors for this dimension. If a person tends to trust national 
institutions or tends to be satisfied with Finnish democracy, she also tends to show a more 
positive attitude towards EU regime principles. In addition to national proxies, both 
European and personal economic considerations also seem to play a role: if the economic 
situation is deemed bad, the attitudes towards this factor also seem to be more negative. 
Finally, there are a few socioeconomic variables. Firstly, there are two variables 
measuring the size and type of the community, which consistently indicate that people in 
rural areas and smaller towns tend to be more sceptical towards regime principles. Being 
part of the working class (by self-assessment) also seems to be an indicator of sceptical 
attitudes towards regime principles. 
The independent variables account for about 51 % of the variance in the fourth factor 
(attachment to the EU as a political community). Considerations about the future of the 
EU seem to have the strongest bearing. If a person feels that future would not be better 
outside the EU (B=-0,401) or that EU will be stronger as a result of the economic crisis 
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(B=0,343), she also tends to show stronger attachment towards the EU. Feeling European 
and knowing one’s rights as an EU citizen also contribute to the level of attachment 
towards the EU.  Having a sense of feeling European or knowing one’s rights as a citizen 
of the European Union tend to produce positive feelings also towards the EU as a political 
community. Opinion about the single currency and satisfaction with national democracy 
are also indicators of support towards this dimension. Finally, there is a somewhat weak 
relationship between the type of community and support, where those who are from rural 
areas tend to be less attached to the EU. 
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7 Conclusion 
Four distinct factors arise from the analysis, depicting the four objects of support, i.e. 
attachment to the community, political principles, political regime and political 
institutions and procedures. These factors account for 63 % of the total variance. The 
results also show that on average, Finns tend to hold more positive than negative feelings 
towards the European Union. Only trust in the European institutions seems to convey 
some negative attitudes, but the other three factors are rather positive. Trust in the future 
of the EU arises as the most significant predictor of attitudes towards the EU. “EU will 
be stronger as a result of the economic crisis” is statistically significant on all factors, and 
“better future outside the EU” item is statistically significant on three factors. Opinions 
on single currency, identifying oneself to the nation only, rural community and 
satisfaction with national democracy are also powerful predictors. 
A few distinct topics arise from these results: The overall favourable attitudes of the 
Finnish public, using of national proxies as basis for opinion formation and identification 
to the nation instead of Europe. Economic considerations are not found to have a big 
impact on attitudes towards the European Union. This is not very surprising, however, 
given the rather unidimensional variables used in the analysis. A bigger range of variables 
would probably give a more refined result. Finally, there are no clear indicators that would 
explain diffuse or specific support as such.  
Finns tend to hold a rather positive attitude towards the European Union in general. This 
finding is also supported by other recent research. Between 1996 and 2014, the long-term 
average of positive evaluations is about 40 %, whereas the average negative views has 
been only about 28 %. Also, the number those who view membership positively has been 
greater than number those who view membership negatively every year. (Haavisto 2014, 
96.) In fact, it would seem that Finnish euroscepticism tends to be associated with single 
political parties or with specific eurosceptic individuals rather than with the public 
opinion. 
Some scholars are sceptical about citizens’ abilities to have a well-informed opinion about 
the European integration. The idea of the cue theory is that underlying values and interests 
need to be primed to become politically salient (Hooghe & Marks 2005, 424). For 
example, Anderson states that European citizens have relatively low levels of information 
regarding European Union. Since the EU is a “complex political phenomenon that often 
appears removed from domestic political reality” (Anderson 1998, 574), citizens employ 
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proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions 
about the European integration process. As member states are key actors in the European 
Union, one would expect domestic politics to shape public views on European integration 
(Hooghe & Marks 2005, 424). The existing research suggests the quality of national 
governance (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000), national democratic performance (Rohrschneider 
2002), or incumbent support and political ideology (Ray 2003) as relevant cues for 
citizens. Citizens can also cue political elites. Hooghe & Marks (2005) and Hooghe (2007, 
6) show that individuals supporting a certain political party tends to follow that party’s 
position on European integration. However, Raunio who has widely studied the attitudes 
of Finnish political parties, has concluded that there is a remarkably wide gap in Finland 
between party position and popular attitudes towards the European Union (Raunio, 2007). 
Recent research has also shown that citizens’ support towards the European Union is often 
driven by individual-level predictors (see for example Arnold et al. 2012, Braun & 
Tausendpfund, 2014). It has also been argued that EU is the most important actor for 
creating and influencing attitudes towards it (Gabel 1998, Eichenberg & Dalton 1993). 
Therefore EU events and policies determine people's orientations, since citizens have 
evolved an independent view of the EU that they also express in their attitudes (Kritzinger 
2003, 220).   
This study finds that although national factors (i.e. satisfaction with national democracy) 
do play a role in opinion formation, European level considerations are just as – if not 
more – important. A similar approach is adopted by the vast literature on Europeanization 
that points out that, although national political arena may affect European political affairs, 
European policies and procedures have nevertheless a significant effect on national 
political arena in terms of affecting national governments, administration, political 
parties, interest groups, national courts, and civil society (see for example Graziano & 
Vink, 2007). 
This study concludes that national identity seems to be a powerful predictor of attitudes 
towards the European Union (see also for example Carey 2002). Euroscepticism could be 
embedded in fear towards foreign cultures, or in a perceived threat of immigration (Carey 
2002, Christin & Trechsel 2002, Mclaren 2002), and this tendency could be also growing 
in Finland. As many as 49 % of Finns feel that globalisation has gone too far and that 
Finnish economy and politics should re-focus on national aspects. Quite many Finns are 
also tempted at the idea of at least partial isolation from the rest of the world (Haavisto 
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2014, 86-87.) 
McLaren has concluded that antipathy towards the EU is largely due to fear of, or hostility 
toward, other cultures. People are ultimately concerned about problems related to the 
degradation of their nation-state, and citizens who are concerned about the possible 
degradation of the nation-state are likely to oppose any institution or system which could 
threaten it. (McLaren (2002, 553-554.) Luedtke also concludes that European citizens are 
opposed to common European immigration policy, largely because supranationalisation 
clashes with historically rooted national identities (Luedtke 2005, 85). Finnish public 
attitudes towards immigration have also toughened. 36 % of Finns do not see the benefits 
of increased immigration, and 46 % would not make immigration easier in order to 
mitigate the risks of ageing population that decreases in number (Haavisto 2014, 93). 
Hooghe and Marks find that where elites are united on Europe, national identity and 
support to European integration coexist peacefully, but if the elites are divided, national 
identity produces euroscepticism (Hooghe & Marks 2005, 437). This argument finds 
support in Finland at least, where the Finns Party (PS) are eurosceptic, but other parties 
have more or less favourable attitudes towards the EU. 
Public opinion has become an important topic at the European arena. As the European 
Union continues the process of widening and deepening integration and touches the 
everyday lives of millions of EU citizens, it is vital that politicians understand what drives 
support for the EU. It has been known for decades now that Europe is difficult to unify if 
citizen support for integration is low or decreasing in some of the member states 
(Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996, 176). Therefore knowing the state of public opinion 
enables the EU as well as national governments to act upon it. Moreover, citizens 
nowadays perceive of the EU as an eligible arena of political contestation, where the same 
political cleavages apply as within national context (left/right, religious/secular, 
environmentalist/non-environmentalist etc.) 
Therefore, studies of public opinion on the EU need to reflect on the different types of 
support or aversion, in order to fully capture the multidimensionality of EU attitudes, 
which has significant implications for the legitimacy of European integration. 
(Boomgarden et al. 2011, 242). This thesis contributes to the existing literature by 
revealing the degree and forms of public euroscepticism in Finland. However, because of 
the multifaceted nature of euroscepticism, this thesis serves as an introductory study and 
thus only scratches the surface of the phenomenon. Therefore, further studies are needed 
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to examine the nature of the existing negative attitudes more thoroughly. 
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9 Appendices 
Appendix 2: Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Distribution of the eigenvalues computed 
Order Mean Quantile selected 
 1  1,237 1,277 
 2  1,193 1,225 
 3  1,159 1,186 
 4  1,130 1,154 
 5  1,102 1,125 
 6  1,077 1,100 
 7  1,052 1,073 
 8  1,029 1,050 
 9  1,007 1,028 
 10  ,983 1,001 
 11  ,961 ,981 
 12  ,940 ,959 
 13  ,917 ,936 
 14  ,896 ,916 
 15  ,871 ,890 
 16  ,845 ,868 
 17  ,818 ,842 
 18  ,781 ,814 
 
 
Number of components/factors to retain according to different rules 
Optimal coordinates Acceleration factor Parallel analysis Kaiser rule 
4 1 4 4 
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Data linked to the different rules 
 
Eigenvalues Proportion of variance Cumulative Parallel analysis 
1 6,088 ,338 ,338 1,277 
2 2,715 ,151 ,489 1,225 
3 1,420 ,079 ,568 1,186 
4 1,181 ,066 ,634 1,154 
5 ,922 ,051 ,685 1,125 
6 ,799 ,044 ,729 1,100 
7 ,680 ,038 ,767 1,073 
8 ,636 ,035 ,802 1,050 
9 ,607 ,034 ,836 1,028 
10 ,521 ,029 ,865 1,001 
11 ,473 ,026 ,891 ,981 
12 ,449 ,025 ,916 ,959 
13 ,417 ,023 ,939 ,936 
14 ,381 ,021 ,961 ,916 
15 ,305 ,017 ,978 ,890 
16 ,252 ,014 ,992 ,868 
17 ,136 ,008 ,999 ,842 
18 ,017 ,001 1,000 ,814 
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Data linked to the different rules 
 
Predicted eigenvalues OC Acceleration factor AF 
1 2,883  NA (< AF) 
2 1,513  2,079  
3 1,264  1,056  
4 ,991 (< OC) -,021  
5 ,865  ,137  
6 ,740  ,003  
7 ,698  ,076  
8 ,673  ,015  
9 ,584  -,058  
10 ,539  ,039  
11 ,521  ,023  
12 ,497  -,008  
13 ,472  -,004  
14 ,401  -,040  
15 ,369  ,023  
16 ,254  -,063  
17 NA  -,002  
18 NA  NA  
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Velicer's MAP values 
 
Squared average partial correlations 4th average partial correlations 
0 ,110 ,035 
1 ,042 ,009 
2 ,037 ,008 
3 ,033 ,005 
4 ,034 ,005 
5 ,042 ,006 
6 ,043 ,006 
7 ,052 ,012 
8 ,064 ,020 
9 ,080 ,025 
10 ,102 ,041 
11 ,140 ,063 
12 ,189 ,087 
13 ,240 ,125 
14 ,349 ,238 
15 ,625 ,523 
16 ,720 ,592 
 
 
Velicer's Minimum Average Partial Test 
 
Velicer's Minimum 
Minimum 
Components to 
retain 
Squared MAP ,033 3 
4th power MAP ,005 3 
 
 
Very Simple Structure 
 
Complexity 1 Complexity 2 
1 ,716 ,000 
2 ,839 ,858 
3 ,656 ,873 
4 ,685 ,860 
5 ,696 ,873 
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Very Simple Structure (Number of factors) 
 
Very Simple Structure (VSS) 
Rotation 
Factoring 
method 
Max VSS 
complexity 1 
N factors 
complexity 1 
Values promax pc ,839 2 
 
Very Simple Structure (Number of factors) 
 
Very Simple Structure (VSS) 
Max VSS 
complexity 2 
N factors 
complexity 2 
Values ,873 3 
 
RGraph 
 
RGraph 
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Factor Analysis 
Communalities 
 
extracted 
Tr ,723 
EUI ,536 
TEP ,930 
TEC ,919 
TECB ,808 
SaDeEU ,563 
FEU ,615 
AttE ,635 
SC ,674 
CInt ,518 
VC ,521 
TTR ,680 
ToBP ,518 
ToFT ,634 
TRfCRA ,516 
RoWiFS ,574 
Fed ,574 
Cult ,468 
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Sorted Factor Loadings (unrotated) 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
TEP ,877 -,008 -,365 -,164 
TEC ,871 ,044 -,351 -,188 
Tr ,844 ,010 -,073 -,076 
FEU ,749 ,061 ,170 ,146 
TECB ,729 ,006 -,508 -,136 
SaDeEU ,723 -,011 ,083 -,181 
EUI ,671 ,001 ,291 -,033 
AttE ,663 ,028 ,228 ,376 
CInt ,648 ,190 ,235 -,082 
VC ,604 ,265 ,210 -,203 
RoWiFS -,145 ,738 -,092 ,006 
TRfCRA -,075 ,710 ,077 ,005 
TTR -,240 ,702 -,355 ,053 
ToFT -,067 ,697 ,266 -,269 
ToBP -,083 ,694 ,168 -,031 
Fed ,326 -,223 ,615 -,197 
SC ,512 ,156 -,073 ,619 
Cult ,306 ,135 ,064 ,594 
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 Variance Explained (initial) 
 
Eigenvalues % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6,088 33,825 33,825 
2 2,715 15,082 48,906 
3 1,420 7,888 56,794 
4 1,181 6,562 63,356 
5 ,922 5,121 68,477 
6 ,799 4,441 72,919 
7 ,680 3,778 76,697 
8 ,636 3,535 80,232 
9 ,607 3,374 83,606 
10 ,521 2,893 86,499 
11 ,473 2,630 89,129 
12 ,449 2,495 91,624 
13 ,417 2,317 93,941 
14 ,381 2,118 96,059 
15 ,305 1,695 97,755 
16 ,252 1,399 99,153 
17 ,136 ,753 99,907 
18 ,017 ,093 100,000 
 
 
Variance Explained (extracted) 
 
Sums of Squared Loadings % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6,088 33,825 33,825 
2 2,715 15,082 48,906 
3 1,420 7,888 56,794 
4 1,181 6,562 63,356 
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Sorted Pattern Matrix 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
TECB 1,065 -,071 -,315 -,039 
TEP 1,035 -,074 -,094 -,031 
TEC 1,032 -,017 -,080 -,054 
Tr ,668 -,041 ,195 ,091 
SaDeEU ,494 -,017 ,383 -,054 
ToFT -,125 ,769 ,260 -,238 
RoWiFS ,023 ,723 -,289 ,055 
ToBP -,178 ,710 ,051 ,038 
TRfCRA -,101 ,709 -,068 ,078 
TTR ,196 ,659 -,630 ,068 
Fed -,298 -,139 ,921 -,147 
EUI ,165 -,009 ,547 ,129 
CInt ,242 ,182 ,458 ,084 
VC ,312 ,279 ,450 -,066 
SC ,049 -,011 -,198 ,873 
Cult -,210 ,002 -,088 ,805 
AttE -,017 -,068 ,310 ,620 
FEU ,234 -,003 ,351 ,361 
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Sorted Structure Matrix 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
TECB ,855 -,021 ,283 ,391 
TEP ,957 -,011 ,489 ,485 
TEC ,955 ,044 ,495 ,475 
Tr ,828 ,031 ,624 ,545 
SaDeEU ,686 ,036 ,644 ,396 
ToFT -,051 ,747 ,125 -,087 
RoWiFS -,063 ,713 -,202 ,026 
ToBP -,076 ,706 ,012 ,055 
TRfCRA -,047 ,707 -,044 ,081 
TTR -,087 ,640 -,441 -,035 
Fed ,148 -,118 ,669 ,103 
EUI ,554 ,055 ,703 ,475 
CInt ,568 ,240 ,651 ,456 
VC ,558 ,323 ,620 ,354 
SC ,413 ,092 ,239 ,805 
Cult ,182 ,084 ,167 ,648 
AttE ,500 ,031 ,586 ,747 
FEU ,637 ,083 ,656 ,654 
 
 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
from Structure Matrix 
 
Sums of Squared Loadings 
1 5,561 
2 2,681 
3 4,229 
4 3,710 
 
 
Rotation Matrix 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
F1 ,942 ,025 ,776 ,711 
F2 ,065 ,987 -,044 ,177 
F3 -,288 ,118 ,604 ,071 
F4 -,161 -,107 -,174 ,677 
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Correlation matrix of rotated factors 
 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
F1 1,000 ,071 ,583 ,551 
F2 ,071 1,000 ,066 ,128 
F3 ,583 ,066 1,000 ,469 
F4 ,551 ,128 ,469 1,000 
 
 
Rotation 
method orthogonal initial rotation 
promax FALSE varimax 
 
 
KMO - Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy 
KMO 
,787 
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MSA - Measures of 
sampling adequacy 
 
MSA 
Tr ,960 
EUI ,818 
TEP ,738 
TEC ,717 
TECB ,892 
SaDeEU ,873 
FEU ,908 
AttE ,850 
SC ,669 
CInt ,893 
VC ,895 
TTR ,574 
ToBP ,683 
ToFT ,773 
TRfCRA ,791 
RoWiFS ,549 
Fed ,856 
Cult ,389 
 
 
GFI (Goodness of Fit) 
GFI (ULS) GFI (ML) 
,924 ,833 
 
 
RMSR (Root Mean 
Square Residual) 
RMSR 
,062 
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Residual correlations with uniqueness on the diagonal (computed between observed and 
reproduced correlations) 
 
Tr EUI TEP TEC TECB SaDeEU 
Tr ,277 -,028 -,017 -,028 -,071 -,061 
EUI -,028 ,464 -,020 ,017 -,024 -,055 
TEP -,017 -,020 ,070 ,050 -,014 -,037 
TEC -,028 ,017 ,050 ,081 -,004 -,070 
TECB -,071 -,024 -,014 -,004 ,192 -,056 
SaDeEU -,061 -,055 -,037 -,070 -,056 ,437 
FEU -,027 ,012 ,002 -,018 -,072 -,005 
AttE -,058 -,043 ,010 ,024 ,005 ,001 
SC -,047 -,033 -,020 ,014 -,010 ,019 
CInt ,005 -,103 -,059 -,064 -,022 -,035 
VC -,023 -,108 -,057 -,067 -,018 -,072 
TTR -,040 ,082 -,027 -,032 -,042 ,017 
ToBP ,006 -,007 ,034 ,050 ,055 -,025 
ToFT ,005 -,024 ,027 ,020 ,065 -,053 
TRfCRA ,040 ,021 ,029 ,015 -,017 ,026 
RoWiFS -,017 -,019 -,012 ,006 -,023 ,061 
Fed -,042 -,094 ,060 ,074 ,111 -,060 
Cult ,063 -,042 ,041 -,003 ,101 -,019 
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Residual correlations with uniqueness on the diagonal (computed between observed and 
reproduced correlations) 
 
FEU AttE SC CInt VC TTR 
Tr -,027 -,058 -,047 ,005 -,023 -,040 
EUI ,012 -,043 -,033 -,103 -,108 ,082 
TEP ,002 ,010 -,020 -,059 -,057 -,027 
TEC -,018 ,024 ,014 -,064 -,067 -,032 
TECB -,072 ,005 -,010 -,022 -,018 -,042 
SaDeEU -,005 ,001 ,019 -,035 -,072 ,017 
FEU ,385 -,075 -,090 -,057 -,043 ,063 
AttE -,075 ,365 ,005 -,051 -,039 ,021 
SC -,090 ,005 ,326 -,033 ,063 ,060 
CInt -,057 -,051 -,033 ,482 ,034 ,025 
VC -,043 -,039 ,063 ,034 ,479 ,000 
TTR ,063 ,021 ,060 ,025 ,000 ,320 
ToBP -,023 ,038 ,008 -,098 -,090 -,046 
ToFT -,022 ,019 ,032 -,055 -,083 -,087 
TRfCRA -,052 -,038 -,025 -,034 -,041 -,089 
RoWiFS ,042 ,018 -,072 -,012 -,015 -,058 
Fed -,061 -,018 ,087 -,136 -,107 ,110 
Cult -,038 -,234 -,269 ,024 -,011 -,144 
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Residual correlations with uniqueness on the diagonal (computed between observed and 
reproduced correlations) 
 
ToBP ToFT TRfCRA RoWiFS Fed Cult 
Tr ,006 ,005 ,040 -,017 -,042 ,063 
EUI -,007 -,024 ,021 -,019 -,094 -,042 
TEP ,034 ,027 ,029 -,012 ,060 ,041 
TEC ,050 ,020 ,015 ,006 ,074 -,003 
TECB ,055 ,065 -,017 -,023 ,111 ,101 
SaDeEU -,025 -,053 ,026 ,061 -,060 -,019 
FEU -,023 -,022 -,052 ,042 -,061 -,038 
AttE ,038 ,019 -,038 ,018 -,018 -,234 
SC ,008 ,032 -,025 -,072 ,087 -,269 
CInt -,098 -,055 -,034 -,012 -,136 ,024 
VC -,090 -,083 -,041 -,015 -,107 -,011 
TTR -,046 -,087 -,089 -,058 ,110 -,144 
ToBP ,482 -,048 -,150 -,156 ,024 -,022 
ToFT -,048 ,366 -,118 -,101 -,053 ,092 
TRfCRA -,150 -,118 ,484 -,092 ,020 ,017 
RoWiFS -,156 -,101 -,092 ,426 ,083 ,030 
Fed ,024 -,053 ,020 ,083 ,426 ,025 
Cult -,022 ,092 ,017 ,030 ,025 ,532 
 
 
Fit of the model to the correlation matrix 
 
Residual fit values 
Residuals > 
0.05 
% residuals > 
0.05 
Values 60 39,216 
 
RGraph 
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RGraph 
 
 
Items, Scales and Realibility 
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Assigned items to clusters (scores are adjusted for reverse scored 
items) 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
Tr 1 0 0 0 
EUI 0 0 1 0 
TEP 1 0 0 0 
TEC 1 0 0 0 
TECB 1 0 0 0 
SaDeEU 1 0 0 0 
FEU 0 0 0 1 
AttE 0 0 0 1 
SC 0 0 0 1 
CInt 0 0 1 0 
VC 0 0 1 0 
TTR 0 1 0 0 
ToBP 0 1 0 0 
ToFT 0 1 0 0 
TRfCRA 0 1 0 0 
RoWiFS 0 1 0 0 
Fed 0 0 1 0 
Cult 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Number of items for 
each scale 
 
N Items 
S 1  5 
S 2  5 
S 3  4 
S 4  4 
 
 
Average correlation 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
,462 ,301 ,305 ,278 
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Intercorrelation of scales 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
S 1  1,000 -,077 ,542 ,526 
S 2  -,077 1,000 ,021 -,006 
S 3  ,542 ,021 1,000 ,520 
S 4  ,526 -,006 ,520 1,000 
 
 
Unattenuated correlations of scales (alpha on the diagonal) 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
S 1  ,811 -,104 ,755 ,750 
S 2  -,104 ,683 ,032 -,009 
S 3  ,755 ,750 ,637 ,836 
S 4  ,032 -,009 ,836 ,607 
 
 
Correlation of items with scales (not corrected) 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
Tr NA NA NA NA 
EUI NA NA NA NA 
TEP NA NA NA NA 
TEC NA NA NA NA 
TECB NA NA NA NA 
SaDeEU NA NA NA NA 
FEU NA NA NA NA 
AttE NA NA NA NA 
SC NA NA NA NA 
CInt NA NA NA NA 
VC NA NA NA NA 
TTR NA NA NA NA 
ToBP NA NA NA NA 
ToFT NA NA NA NA 
TRfCRA NA NA NA NA 
RoWiFS NA NA NA NA 
Fed NA NA NA NA 
Cult NA NA NA NA 
 
 
94 
 
 Correlation of items with scales (corrected for item overlap) 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
Tr ,642 -,097 ,614 ,539 
EUI ,512 -,052 ,605 ,566 
TEP ,885 -,116 ,522 ,532 
TEC ,873 -,064 ,547 ,533 
TECB ,650 -,091 ,362 ,389 
SaDeEU ,549 -,078 ,633 ,526 
FEU ,573 -,049 ,671 ,623 
AttE ,463 -,055 ,579 ,693 
SC ,359 ,003 ,335 ,585 
CInt ,493 ,065 ,620 ,502 
VC ,467 ,138 ,579 ,455 
TTR -,112 ,497 -,186 -,058 
ToBP -,065 ,550 ,035 ,042 
ToFT -,062 ,558 ,114 -,062 
TRfCRA -,045 ,518 ,031 -,011 
RoWiFS -,063 ,546 -,073 -,028 
Fed ,182 -,147 ,337 ,216 
Cult ,109 ,029 ,119 ,212 
 
 
Ordinal coefficient alpha 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
,918 ,775 ,669 ,704 
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Ordinal coefficient alpha if item deleted 
 
S 1  S 2  S 3  S 4  
Tr ,907 NA NA NA 
EUI NA NA ,577 NA 
TEP ,869 NA NA NA 
TEC ,873 NA NA NA 
TECB ,903 NA NA NA 
SaDeEU ,938 NA NA NA 
FEU NA NA NA ,616 
AttE NA NA NA ,581 
SC NA NA NA ,609 
CInt NA NA ,553 NA 
VC NA NA ,566 NA 
TTR NA ,733 NA NA 
ToBP NA ,737 NA NA 
ToFT NA ,738 NA NA 
TRfCRA NA ,738 NA NA 
RoWiFS NA ,723 NA NA 
Fed NA NA ,700 NA 
Cult NA NA NA ,740 
 
  
96 
 
Appendix 3: Scatterplots Factor 1: Trust in institutions and procedures 
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Appendix 4: Scatterplots Factor 2: Economic regime performance 
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Appendix 5: Scatterplots Factor 3: Regime principles 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
  
102 
 
Appendix 6: Scatterplots Factor 4 Attachment to EU as a political community 
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Appendix 7: Scatterplots for factor 1 
Trust in institutions and procedures 
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Appendix 8: Scatterplots for factor 2 
Economic regime performance 
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Appendix 9: Scatterplots for factor 3 
Regime principles 
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Appendix 10: Scatterplots for factor 4 Attachment to the EU as a political community 
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Appendix 11: Response values for scatterplots (appendices 7-10)
